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Radio signals propagating through the ionised upper atmosphere (the ionosphere) in low 
latitude regions of the world can experience amplitude scintillation.  This could threaten 
safety-critical applications of satellite navigation such as aviation. The research presented 
here studied the effects of amplitude scintillation on a Septentrio PolaRxS geodetic receiver 
and a Garmin 480 aviation receiver by means of a Spirent GNSS constellation simulator.  
Different types of fade profiles showed that an abrupt drop in signal strength caused a loss of 
lock on the signal more often than a profile with a slow, gradual fade. A performance 
comparison of the two receivers demonstrated that the aviation receiver was more vulnerable 
than the geodetic receiver. An unexpected loss of lock at a specific fade duration and depth 
was seen with the Garmin receiver and was not explained.  A single fade with a long fade 
duration was more likely to cause a loss of signal lock compared to rapid multiple fades. 
Scintillation on signals from low elevation satellites can significantly degrade the precision 
and integrity of the navigation solution in an aviation receiver; especially if the satellites are 
within the best geometrical set. RAIM was observed to be no longer available during the 
critical landing approach phase of the scenario, in the case when all satellites in view were 
affected by the scintillation-induced signal perturbations.  
A technique was also developed to simulate L5 scintillation based on real scintillation events 
of L1, in the absence of real captured data for L5. This was done to enable future 
investigations on aviation receiver performance when both L1 and L5 frequencies experience 
scintillation. Analysis indicated that L5 signal can be more vulnerable to the scintillation 
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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION 
Since its launch in the 1980s, Global Positioning System (GPS) has been established as the 
most widely used Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) and has offered innumerable 
benefits to the aviation industry. GPS services are not only providing accuracy in aircraft 
navigation but they also provide a better safety during all phases of flight operation. In 
addition, GPS services has the potential to improve efficiency by increasing their landing 
capacity, while providing a cost advantage from reduced fuel consumption when faster 
routes or waypoints could be implemented. These possibilities are enhanced with the 
realisation of augmentation systems such as the Aircraft Based-, Space Based-, and Ground 
Based Augmentation Systems (ABAS, SBAS and GBAS, respectively) capable of providing 
improved accuracy, integrity, continuity and availability of GPS services.  
While the underlying capabilities of GPS assure high accuracy navigation services applicable 
to aviation, the system is not without its vulnerabilities. One such vulnerability is where 
GPS-based navigation has a possibility to suffer from short-term losses of services due to the 
effects of the ionosphere. The ionosphere is the upper region of the atmosphere located 
between approximately 60 km up to over 600 km above the earth’s surface. It consists of 
ionised plasma and free electrons that influence GNSS signals propagating through the 
region.  Ionospheric irregularities can cause rapid variations in amplitude and phase of the 
signals, known as ionospheric scintillation. The severity of scintillation depends on the 
location, time and solar cycle conditions. For example, strong amplitude scintillation is 
particularly experienced at low latitudes, with the largest effects on GNSS receivers seen 
during geomagnetic storms, especially during the solar maximum in the 11-year solar cycle. 
Aircraft landing approaches using GPS in the equatorial region can thus be challenging as 
the signals may experience high amplitude scintillation, resulting in reduced availability 
and/or integrity of GPS services. Even though the augmentation system is robust and more 
sensitive to ionospheric effects by providing the ionospheric correction; there is still a 
possibility for ionospheric effects to occur because the augmentation systems do not address 
scintillation. It is therefore vital to understand how this phenomenon impacts aviation GPS 




Previously, statistically modelled ionospheric scintillation events have been used to analyse 
the behaviour of typical commercial GNSS receivers. The research presented here aims to 
establish a new systematic method that differs from using a mathematical model to analyse 
GPS L1 receiver performance under scintillation conditions. The new method uses actual 
scintillation observations, which can include deep and sudden fading that may not be well 
represented in a statistical model.   
The technique aims to understand GPS receiver response to different fade depths and 
durations by means of GNSS simulation in hardware using a Spirent GNSS constellation 
simulator. Analysis of receiver behaviour includes the investigation of amplitude scintillation 
effects on the aircraft navigation positioning solutions. Of interest are the effects on the 
accuracy and integrity on specific receiver types, and on the ability of a receiver to detect 
and warn the user of signal degradation. The research focuses on the effects on the ABAS – 
Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring (RAIM) –a standalone system which output is 
used for non-precision aircraft approach. In addition, the impact of amplitude scintillation on 
the new L5 frequency for civil aviation, which allows for frequency diversity, is also 
investigated. A technique is developed to simulate L5 from L1 so that that can be applied to 
the simulators to assess the effects. Data collected over the past few years in Cape Verde by 
the University of Bath are used as the basis of the case studies for the analysis.  
The research is discussed here as follows: Chapter 2 gives an overview of GPS with specific 
emphasis on how GPS receivers operate. The implementation of GPS to support navigation 
systems in civil aviation is also explained. This is followed by an overview of the ionosphere 
in Chapter 3, with a particular focus on the ionosphere at low latitudes of the Earth. The 
ionospheric scintillation threat to GNSS signals is addressed in this chapter. 
Chapter 4 introduces a new method for simulating ionospheric scintillation by means of a 
Spirent GNSS constellation simulator. First, the simulation processes implemented to 
investigate the effects of amplitude scintillation applied in this study are outlined. This is 
followed by describing the process of preparing scintillation events, guides to the file format 
construction and then onto the steps of creating a simulation scenarios.  
In Chapter 5, a systematic analysis through simulations is discussed, which investigates how 
the depth and duration of a fade may cause GPS receivers to lose lock on the signal. The 
results demonstrate the performance of geodetic and aviation receivers when experiencing 
different levels of fades.  
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Chapter 6 focuses on the effects of fading on a GPS aviation receiver during simulated 
aircraft approaches. In this chapter, two case studies were created, firstly to investigate the 
impact of temporary frequent fading on satellite availability and geometry (and hence 
Geometric Dilution of Precision (GDOP)). The second case study is to understand the effects 
of deep and long duration fades which threaten RAIM availability. 
Chapter 7 introduces real pre-recorded amplitude scintillation events from Cape Verde, 
during an aircraft simulation of turning and approaching a landing. This is to demonstrate the 
challenge to GPS-based navigation under equatorial scintillation conditions. 
Chapter 8 develops a technique to generate L5 scintillation from L1signal to understand the 
effects of scintillation on multiple GPS frequencies used in aviation. First, the relation 
between L1 and L5 intensities derived from well-established relationship between S4 and 
frequencies is shown. Then, scintillation signatures for the L5 signal are created by 
employing L1 scintillation events collected from Cape Verde, after which both scintillation 
profiles are applied simultaneously to the scenario simulation. The receiver responses to the 
two different frequencies used in aviation were recorded and analysed. 
Finally, the thesis is concluded in Chapter 9 by summarising the results and discussing future 
developments that may be undertaken based on this research. 
1.2 Research Objectives 
The thesis aims to study equatorial ionospheric scintillation effects on receiver performance 
by:  
 Developing a systematic synthetic analysis of fade depth and duration to understand 
the effects on signal loss-of-lock 
 Investigating the importance of satellite geometry and how fading and real 
scintillation events can threaten GNSS aviation applications 
 Understanding the effects of ionospheric scintillation on a multiple frequency used 
in aviation 




CHAPTER 2  
GPS AND AVIATION 
2.1 Introduction  
This chapter begins with an overview of the GPS by briefly describes the GPS signal 
structure and followed by the principles of GPS. The general GPS receivers operation is then 
explains in this chapter.  The second part of this chapter gives an overview on the GPS 
application in aviation. The use of GPS to support navigation systems in civil aviation is 
explained.  
2.2 Global Positioning System (GPS)  
The Global Positioning System (GPS) is currently the leading Global Navigation Satellite 
System (GNSS) in providing positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) services. The other 
operational GNSSs, at the time of writing, are GLONASS and Galileo from Russia and the 
European Union, respectively. By 2020, Galileo will be fully operational, while China’s 
regional BeiDou Navigation Satellite System will be expanded into the global  BeiDou-2 
navigation system [online: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-4366_en.htm (last 
accessed 3 March 2017)][Weirong, 2017]. As GPS is used solely in this study, this section 
will only explain the basic operation of GPS.  
Initially restricted to the US military, GPS is now being widely used commercially and 
publicly in many applications such as navigation of vehicles, aircraft and ships. The baseline 
configuration of GPS comprises of 24 satellites located in 6 earth-centred orbital planes at 
26,600 km radius with a 55º inclination. The ascending nodes of the orbital planes are 
equally spaced at 60º apart. Each satellite orbits the earth with a period of approximately 12 
hours (11 hours 58 minutes sidereal) allowing at least 4 satellites to be in view from any 
location at a given time [Conley et al., 2006; Kintner et al., 2007]. The GPS constellation is 




Figure 2.1 GPS constellation [image credit: https://www.nasa.gov]. 
2.2.1 The Signal Structure 
Each GPS satellite (of the original, legacy constellation) transmits the navigation message on 
two L-band carrier frequencies at 1,575.42 MHz (10.23 MHz × 154) and 1,227.60 MHz 
(10.23 MHz × 120), known as L1 and L2, respectively. The coarse acquisition code C/A and 
the encrypted precise code P(Y) are modulated onto L1, while only P(Y) code is modulated 
onto L2. The C/A code, which is modulated at 1.023 MHz on L1, provides an accuracy of 5 
– 15m and is available for civilian users. Meanwhile, the P(Y) code, which is transmitted at 
10.23 MHz on both L1 and L2, give a higher accuracy of 3 – 5m but is only provided for 
military users [Kintner et al., 2007].  
 





Figure 2.2 Spectra of the legacy GPS signals (L1 (C/A and P(Y)) and L2 P(Y)) as well as 
modernised GPS signals (L2C, L5, and L1C) on their operating frequency band. Note that there 
are also modernised GPS signals for military user (M code) resides on L1 and L2 frequencies 
[image credit: http://www.navipedia.net]. 
It must be noted that a modernised version of GPS is currently being implemented for 
civilian use. Three additional signals – L2C, L5 and L1C – have been designed to provide a 
higher accuracy for GPS applications that could be obtained without the P(Y) code that is 
used for high precision PNT solutions by the military. The L2C and L5 have started their 
operation, while L1C is expected to be launched in 2017 [National Coordination Office for 
Space-Based Positioning Navigation and Timing, 2016]. The L2C signal is a second signal 
designed to be used for non-safety of life applications, operated at the L2 band (1,227.60 
MHz).  This is of particular use for civilians requiring to solve the ionospheric delay 
problems, as they need to estimate the ionospheric total electric content (TEC) using dual-
frequency receivers. In the past with the legacy signals, this was done by tracking the L1 
signal and P(Y) code from the L2 signal using a fragile semi-codeless technique [Ward et al., 
2006b]. Conversely, with the availability of the L2C signal, the ionospheric delay problems 
can be solved directly and more accurately by using the carrier phase of the two signals (L1 
C/A and L2C) and differential processing techniques. 
The L5 is the third civilian GPS signal intended particularly for safety of life applications 
such as aviation. It is operated in the aeronautical radio navigation services (ARNS) radio 
band, at 1,176.45 MHz (10.23 MHz × 115). Due to the relevance of the L5 signal in this 
study, a further explanation on L5 is included here.  
L5 (1,176.45 MHz) 
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The L5 signal has two codes, each 10,230 bits long and transmitted at 10.23 MHz. The first 
code is the in-phase (I5) code while the second code is in quadrature with the I5 code, and is 
known as a quadrature-phase (Q5) code [Ward et al., 2006a]. The L5 is broadcast at a higher 
power level than L1 C/A (~3 dB higher than L1 C/A) so that reception can be improved, 
especially for indoor users. The bandwidth of L5 is also larger than other signals to make it 
become more robust [Spilker and Vandierendonck, 2001; Ward et al., 2006a; Misra and 
Enge, 2011]. This frequency diversity allows aviation receivers to accurately derive 
ionospheric delays, which was not directly possible with the legacy system consisting of 
only one civilian GPS frequency (L1 C/A) in the ARNS radio band [Spilker and 
Vandierendonck, 2001]. This capability enhances safety in civil aviation as a redundant 
signal is available to rely on, in the event one signal becomes weak due to perturbations. 
Another new GPS signal planned for dedicated civilian use is the L1C, which is operated in 
the L1 band. This signal will allow interoperability of other international satellite navigation 
systems with GPS. In the future, higher user accuracy is expected to be achieved with the 
existence of all these signals (L1, L2, L2C, L5 and L1C), together with faster processing 
methods used to obtain position, velocity and time (PVT) solutions [Kaplan, 2006; National 
Coordination Office for Space-Based Positioning Navigation and Timing, 2016]. The main 
characteristics of each of the civilian signals are summarised in Table 2.1. 












PRN Code Length 
Legacy 
L1 C/A  
code 
1,575.42 2.046 -158.5 1023 
L1 P(Y)  
code 









L2C 1,227.60 2.046 -160.0 
CM:10,230 
CL:767,250 
(2 PRN sequences are chip-by-
chip multiplexed) 
L5 1,176.45 20.46 -154.9 
I5: 10,230 
Q5: 10,230 
(two components are in phase 
quadrature) 
L1C 1,575.42 4.092* -157.0 N/A 
* Null-to-null bandwidth for binary offset carrier (BOC) modulation is defined here as the bandwidth between the 
outer nulls of the largest spectral lobes. 
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2.2.2 Principles of GPS 
The first stage of positioning with GPS is to acquire signals from at least four satellites.  
Each satellite continuously transmits a unique Pseudo-Random Number (PRN) code which is 
repeated every 1 millisecond (e.g L1 C/A). The receiver attempts to identify the code by 
correlating the received signal with a locally generated PRN code. The process of acquisition 
is explained in more detail in Section 2.2.3. 
By receiving signals from three known locations of satellites 𝑆𝑖 ( 𝑥𝑠𝑖 , 𝑦𝑠𝑖 , 𝑧𝑠𝑖), the receiver 
can determine its unknown location in three dimensions ( 𝑥𝑟, 𝑦𝑟 , 𝑧𝑟) by using Equation (2.1) 
[Tsui, 2000].  
                      𝜌𝑆𝑖,𝑟 = √(𝑥𝑠𝑖 − 𝑥𝑟)
2
+ (𝑦𝑠𝑖 − 𝑦𝑟)
2
+ (𝑧𝑠𝑖 − 𝑧𝑟)
2
                           (2.1) 
The true range, 𝜌𝑖𝑇, between the receiver and ith satellite is: 
                                     𝜌𝑖𝑇 = 𝑐(𝑡𝑟 − 𝑡𝑠𝑖)              (2.2) 
where, c is the speed of light in vacuum, 𝑡𝑟 is the true time receiver received the signal and, 
𝑡𝑠𝑖 is the true time satellite sent a signal. The fourth satellite is then used to solve for the time 
variable.  
However, since both satellite and receiver times are not synchronised, it is very difficult to 
attain the correct time from the satellite or the receiver. Therefore, clock errors from both the 
satellite and receiver need to be considered. The range measurement between the satellite 
and the receiver without the correction for clock biases is known as pseudorange, 𝜌 [Spilker 
Jr. and Parkinson, 1996; Kaplan et al., 2006] and is given by: 
         𝜌 = 𝑐[(𝑡𝑟 + 𝑏) − (𝑡𝑠𝑖 + 𝐵)] 
                                   = 𝑐(𝑡𝑟 − 𝑡𝑠𝑖) + 𝑐(𝑏 − 𝐵)  
                                   = 𝜌𝑖𝑇 + 𝑐(𝑏 − 𝐵)                                                  (2.3) 
where b is the receiver clock error and B is the satellite clock error. There are also other 
factors which influence the pseudorange calculation, namely, the ionospheric delay, 
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tropospheric delay, multipath and noise [Spilker Jr. and Parkinson, 1996; Kaplan et al., 
2006]. Equation (2.4) shows the pseudorange equation considering all the errors. 
     𝜌 = 𝜌𝑖𝑇 + 𝑐(𝑏 − 𝐵 + 𝑇 + 𝐼 + 𝑟 +  𝑚 + △ 𝑣)                  (2.4) 
where T is the tropospheric delay error, I is the ionospheric delay error, r is the receiver noise 
error, 𝑚 is the multipath and △ 𝑣 is the relativistic time correction. The total error 
contribution from each component along the path from a satellite to a receiver is called user 
equivalent range error (UERE) [Conley et al., 2006]. Among these errors, the ionospheric 
delay error is the main contributing source which affect the pseudorange measurement 
[Klobuchar, 1996]. 
The error in the GPS solution can be estimated from Equation (2.5).  
Error in GPS Solution   = Geometry Factor (DOP)     x Pseudorange Error 
Factor (UERE) 
(2.5) 
where the pseudorange error factor is the satellite UERE and the geometry factor is the 
dilution of precision (DOP) [Conley et al., 2006]. The DOP which is a function of satellite 
geometry is determined by the position of the satellites [Tsui, 2000]. The most general 
parameter for DOP is called the Geometric Dilution of Precision (GDOP) and is expressed 
as: 








       
(2.6) 
The σx, σy and σz denote the covariance of the user position (x,y,z) while σct denotes the 
covariance of the time bias. Therefore, GDOP can be defined as the ratio between 
combinations of covariance of the user position and time bias, and the covariance of the 
pseudorange errors (UERE). Other than geometric, DOP can also be expressed in terms of 3-
D position, horizontal position, vertical position and time [Spilker Jr., 1996; Conley et al., 
2006], as shown from Equations (2.7) - (2.10).  
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(2.8) 
Vertical Dilution of Precision (VDOP) =
𝜎𝑧
𝜎𝑈𝐸𝑅𝐸
        (2.9) 
Time Dilution of Precision (TDOP) =
𝜎𝑐𝑡
𝜎𝑈𝐸𝑅𝐸
        (2.10) 
Thus, one of the main factors affecting the precision of the GPS PVT solution is the satellite 
geometry, with a higher precision obtained when the satellites are significantly apart from 
each other. This means that the dilution of precision decreases as the separation between 
satellites increases – leading to a best satellite geometry for a given sky view that gives the 
corresponding lowest DOP [Tsui, 2000]. Figure 2.3 illustrates this concept.  
 
Figure 2.3 Satellite geometry leads to different DOP values. 
2.2.3 GPS Receiver Operation  
GPS receivers compute the users’ position, velocity and time by processing the signals 
received from the visible satellites.  The typical GPS receiver architecture is illustrated in 
Figure 2.4. It consists of an antenna, RF front end, baseband processing, application 
processing and the output of PVT. This section covers the baseband processor part, where 




Figure 2.4 Block diagram of generic GPS receiver. 
Acquisition is the process of searching for signals from the visible satellites. The received 
signal PRN code needs to correlate with a replica of the code generated locally by the 
receiver. If the phase of the replica code does not match with the phase of the received PRN 
code, the replica code needs to be shifted until it does match to accomplish code correlation. 
Maximum correlation occurs when phases of the receiver replica and received signal codes 
match, while minimum correlation occurs when the phase of the replica code is offset by 
more than one chip on either side of the received signal PRN code  [Ward et al., 2006b; 
Misra and Palod, 2011]. It must be noted that the receiver must also detect the carrier signal 
from the satellites by replicating the carrier signal plus the Doppler effect as there is relative 
motion between satellite and receiver, resulting in carrier phase and carrier Doppler shifts 
[Ward et al., 2006b; Misra and Palod, 2011]. Figure 2.5 summarises this process and the rest 
of the carrier tracking loop function.  
It must be noted that during a cold start, the receiver does not have any information on the 
satellite configuration. The receiver may thus take up to 15 minutes to acquire the minimum 
of four satellites in view. Meanwhile during a warm start, when a satellite signal is acquired, 
less time is needed for the rest of the satellite signals to be acquired as the receiver had 
already detected the respective satellite locations above the horizon and its estimated 





Figure 2.5 GNSS Receiver carrier tracking loop [Gunawardena, 2014]. 
Once the received code and carrier are synchronised with the receiver replicas, the receiver 
needs to make sure its code chip rate continuously maintains the match with the incoming 
code chip rate precisely, i.e. it remains locked, while tracking takes place. Signal tracking, 
involves carrier and code tracking through two separate processes. In carrier tracking, a 
phase-locked loop (PLL) or a frequency-locked loop (FLL) is used to compute the carrier 
phase and carrier Doppler shift. However, FLLs can only use to track carrier Doppler shift 
while PLLs are competent in tracking both carrier phase and carrier Doppler shift. Therefore 
PLLs are more capable of tracking the signals in the presence of ionospheric scintillation. 
Details of ionospheric scintillation will be discussed in Chapter 3. In contrast to carrier 
tracking, code tracking uses a delay-locked loop (DLL) to compute the code shift [Ward et 
al., 2006b; Kintner et al., 2007; Graas et al., 2009]. Since PLLs are more relevant to this 
study, they are discussed in more detail below. For clarity, the PLLs are discussed with 
respect to the L1 C/A code. However, the concept is applicable to other GNSS signals as 
well. 
 
Figure 2.6 Basic PLL [Gunawardena, 2014]. 
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During PLL operation, the carrier tracking loop functions as a tool to maintain a zero-phase 
error between the replica carrier and the received carrier signals. Any phase shift error in the 
replica carrier signal generates a non-zero phase angle of the prompt I and Q vector 
magnitude so that the carrier tracking loop can identify and modify precisely the amount and 
direction of the phase change. Maximum (signal plus noise) I signal and minimum 
(containing only noise) Q signal occur when the PLL achieve phase lock [Ward et al., 
2006b]. Figure 2.6 shows a basic PLL diagram. 
Once the signal is successfully acquired and tracked, this means the receiver has locked onto 
the signal. GPS is a weak signal system, with the L1 C/A signals having a nominal received 
signal power of approximately -158.5 dBW. The receiver interprets the signal as the ratio of 
received signal power to the ambient noise level which is known as the carrier-to-noise ratio 
(C/N0), expressed in dB-Hz, which is approximately 46.5 dB-Hz for L1 C/A. If the receiver 
detects the C/N0 to be above the typical threshold value of 26-30 dB-Hz, depending on 
receiver design, the receiver continuous to track the signal from the satellite. However, the 
receiver may stop tracking the signal if the signal experiences: 
a)  Deep signal fades which are below the threshold value, resulting in a loss of lock  
[Braasch and Dierendonck, 1999; Kintner et al., 2007].  
b) Fast phase variations which affect the receiver’s PLL performance to maintain the 
tracking. This may cause cycle slips or even complete loss of lock [Humphreys et 
al., 2010a, 2010b].  
2.3 GPS in Aviation 
Since the launch of GPS in the early 1980s, it has provided many benefits to civil aviation. 
Used as a navigation system, GPS has increased safety and performance in all phases of 
flight – manoeuvring for take-off, en-route navigation, final approach and landing.  
As aviation is a safety-of-life application, it is essential for aircraft navigation systems to 
meet the four stringent criteria: integrity, continuity, accuracy, and availability. Integrity, 
defined as the ability to provide an alert to users if the system is not reliable, is considered 
the key element in the safety aspect of the navigation system. In contrast, the continuity is 
the possibility of the system performance to be available during the operation, with the 
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assumption that the system was obtainable initially. Accuracy signifies how close the 
navigation output is from the truth. The last criterion is availability, which is defined by 
Conley et al. [2006] as “.. an indication of the ability of the system to provide a usable 
navigation service within a specified coverage area.” 
While it is important for GPS performance to satisfy the above criteria for use in aviation in 
any capacity, they are crucial requirements if GPS is the primary source of the navigation 
system.  Augmentation systems have thus been developed that enables GPS to meet the 
required standards and to be used in aircraft navigation systems.  The International Civil 
Aviation Organisation (ICAO) defines these GPS augmentation systems as ABAS (Aircraft 
Based Augmentation Systems), GBAS (Ground Based Augmentation System) and SBAS 
(Satellite Based Augmentation system). Among these three augmentation systems, only 
ABAS is a standalone system, while SBAS and GBAS are dependent on reference receivers 
at known locations to employ differential corrections. As such, they are known as differential 
GPS (DGPS) [Cosentino et al., 2006]. 
2.3.1 Aircraft Based Augmentation System (ABAS) 
An augmentation system which integrates the information available onboard the aircraft 
from other navigation instruments, with the information gained from GNSS elements is 
called ABAS [International Civil Aviation Organization, 2005]. This operation of 
independent instruments is essential to provide additional information on integrity, especially 
when the aircraft is unable to use other augmentation systems (e.g. SBAS and GBAS require 
the aircraft to operate within the coverage area). The most common ABAS technique being 
implemented with many aircraft receivers nowadays is called Receiver Autonomous 
Integrity Monitoring (RAIM) [International Civil Aviation Organization, 2005]. RAIM is a 
method that uses algorithms to detect the existence of unacceptable large position errors with 
the requirement that there are at least five visible satellites. In order to detect the faulty 
signals, redundant satellite range measurements are performed and the measurement data 
compared. A statistical function determines if the range is inconsistent for a particular 
satellite, and then isolates that satellite from being considered in the solution.   If the satellite 
cannot be isolated, a warning flag is raised to indicate that GPS should not be used for 
navigation. An extension of RAIM is Fault Detection and Exclusion (FDE), which can detect 
a faulty signal as well as exclude it from the navigation solution. To perform this, FDE 
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requires at least six satellites visible in space [Brown, 1996; International Civil Aviation 
Organization, 2005; Conley et al., 2006]. 
In both RAIM and FDE algorithms, the three input parameters involved are the measurement 
geometry, the standard deviation of measurement noise and the maximum allowable 
probabilities for a false alert and a missed detection. The output parameter for the algorithms 
is the Horizontal Protection Level (HPL). HPL is a radius of a circle in the aircraft’s local 
horizontal plane where the position integrity is guaranteed for the area determined by the 
radius [International Civil Aviation Organization, 2005; Conley et al., 2006]. The smaller 
the value of HPL, with the true position of the aircraft being at the centre of the circle, the 
more integrity is assured. RAIM is generally available as long as the HPL is below a certain 
maximum limit, known as the Horizontal Alert Limit (HAL). If the HPL is greater than HAL 
for a duration longer than a threshold time known as time-to-alert, then the service becomes 
unavailable. Note that the alert limit is different depending on flight operations as some 
operations require more protection than others [Walter et al., 2000; International Civil 
Aviation Organization, 2005; Conley et al., 2006]. Table 2.2 lists the RAIM integrity 
performance requirements for different flight operations. 





Time to Alert (s)  
En-route 
3.7 to 7.4 km 












RAIM has been used since the mid-1990s to provide horizontal positioning information 
during en-route, terminal and non-precision approach (NPA).  However, RAIM is not able to 
support precision approach (PA) operations since it cannot provide vertical positioning 
information which requires more stringent requirements. Figure 2.7 illustrates the horizontal 




Figure 2.7 Horizontal and vertical protection levels. 
Studies on RAIM algorithms have been ongoing since the 1980s. There are many algorithms 
available for RAIM, but this section only focuses on two RAIM algorithms as they are the 
most widely used.  Y.C. Lee introduced an algorithm in 1986 known as a range comparison 
method [Brown, 1996]. This algorithm solves the four unknowns in the equations of the first 
four satellites in view, assuming there is no noise in the measurements. If for example there 
are six satellites are in view, the solution that satisfies the first four equations is used to 
predict the remaining two equations. The difference between the predicted values and the 
actual measured values become the range of the algorithm.  A small range is considered as 
not having a failure, while a large range indicates a failure [Brown, 1996]. 
The second method is the maximum separation of solution, suggested by Brown and 
McBurney in 1987 [Brown, 1996]. In determining a position using GPS satellites, there can 
be many subsets of solutions which consist of a minimum of four satellites from the 
available satellites. If it is assumed that one satellite failed, and its pseudorange error 
gradually increased with time, the solutions of the subsets containing the failed satellite 
moves away from the true position. However, a subset containing only healthy satellites 
remains close to the true position. This method detects the faulty satellite based on a 
comparison between the solution generated by all subsets and the solution generated by each 
one of the subsets. If this maximum observed solution separation is greater than a defined 
threshold, an alarm is raised  [Brown, 1996]. Figure 2.8 illustrates this method with one 
faulty satellite among a total of five satellites in view. This method can be improved for 
multiple hypotheses which known as Multiple Hypothesis Solution Separation (MHSS). 
MHSS accepts K faulty measurements simultaneously in its protection level computation 




Figure 2.8 Maximum separation of solution is one of the RAIM algorithm suggested by Brown 
and McBurney in 1987. 
2.3.2 Space Based Augmentation System (SBAS)  
The motivation for the development of SBAS systems was to provide a high quality and 
accurate service for civil aviation. The SBAS architecture consists of ground network and 
SBAS satellites in Geostationary Earth Orbit (GEO). The ground network consists of 
reference receiver stations, master station and ground station. The reference receiver stations 
are dispersed throughout the SBAS area, and are the most fundamental element of the SBAS 
system. There are normally multiple receivers and antennas at a given reference station that 
receive data from all GPS satellites in view. This allows individual failures to be detected 
and eliminated before the data are forwarded to the master station. Using this data and the 
accurately known locations of the reference stations, the master station can then accurately 
determine the differential corrections and integrity for each monitored GPS satellites. The 
correction and integrity messages are then sent to a ground station to be uplinked to the 
satellites in GEO [Sam Pullen et al., 2002; Cosentino et al., 2006]; which are subsequently 
broadcast by the GEO satellites to be used by aircraft users. Figure 2.9 shows the concept of 
SBAS operation. Several SBAS systems currently cover different regions of the world. The 
three operational SBAS are WAAS in the US, EGNOS in Europe and MSAS in Japan. Other 
SBAS systems which are under development are GAGAN from India, SDCM from Russia 




 Figure 2.9 SBAS operation. 
The high accuracy obtained from SBAS corrections enables aircraft to reliably depend on 
GPS at all phases of flight within its coverage area. Significant errors such as the ionospheric 
delay can be corrected by a single-frequency SBAS, thus allowing the receiver to provide an 
accurate position, and both horizontal and vertical guidance precision approach operations 
[Cosentino et al., 2006]. Table 2.3 lists the horizontal and vertical level limits together with 
the time-to-alert for each stage of flight operation. 
Table 2.3 ICAO GNSS signal-in-space performance requirements. 
Operation/Phase of flight 
Alert Limit (m) Time to 
Alert (s) Horizontal Vertical 
En-route 
3.7 to 7.4 km 
(2 to 4 NM) 




N/A 15 sec 
Non-precision approach (NPA) 
556 m 
(0.3 NM) 
N/A 10 sec 




( 164 ft) 
10 sec 









10 to 15 m 




2.3.3 Ground Based Augmentation System (GBAS) 
In contrast to SBAS, which provides services over large areas, GBAS provides a more 
localised service for airports by having a few reference receivers with antennas positioned 
close to each other. These reference receivers receive signals from GPS satellites to calculate 
their position. A GBAS ground facility works together with the reference receivers to 
calculate errors and produce a GBAS correction message. The GBAS correction message is 
then sent to a Very High Frequency (VHF) Data Broadcast (VDB) that broadcast the GBAS 
signal via a radio data link. Aircraft within the GBAS area receives the broadcast correction, 
which can then be applied to the navigation solution. The coverage area of GBAS is 
approximately 30 km in radius and enables differential corrections and integrity data to be 
broadcast during airport approaches and landings [Blanch et al., 2012; Navipedia 
contributors, 2014a]. GBAS, therefore, supports all flight phases from en-route through to 
category I precision approach operations as shown in Table 2.3 
It is evident from this brief overview of the augmentation systems that both SBAS and 
GBAS provide superior integrity information for the aircraft system relative to ABAS. 
However, implementation of these systems require extensive resources and computing power 
due to the complexity of the infrastructure [Speidel et al., 2013], resulting in a markedly 
higher cost for SBAS and GBAS compared to the standalone system, ABAS.   
 
Figure 2.10 GBAS architecture.  
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CHAPTER 3  
THE IONOSPHERE AND ITS EFFECT ON GPS 
3.1 Introduction  
This chapter gives an overview on the ionospheric threats on GNSS, particularly at low 
latitudes of the Earth. Firstly, a brief explanation on the ionosphere is given by focusing on 
the ionosphere at low latitudes. This is followed by the general effects of the ionosphere on 
the radio signals. The focus is then given to the ionospheric threats and how the structure of 
the ionosphere, especially at equatorial regions can affect all GNSS signals (including GPS) 
by defining the ionospheric scintillation. Finally, the impacts of scintillation on GPS 
receivers operation are then elaborated further, as it is the focus of this research.  
3.2 The Ionosphere 
The ionosphere is the upper region of the atmosphere located between approximately 60 km 
and approximately 600 km above the Earth’s surface. In this region, atoms and molecules 
from the neutral atmosphere are ionised by solar radiation (primarily EUV and X-rays) 
producing generally equal numbers of free electrons and positive ions, yields a medium of 
electrically neutral. Even though the numbers of charged particles are less compared to the 
neutral atmospheric components, they employ an excessive influence on the electrical 
properties of the medium. Hence, the ionosphere possibly permits large distance of radio 
communication [Hargreaves, 1992; Hunsucker and Hargreaves, 2003]. 
A number of factors have contributed to the formation of different layers which defines the 
vertical structure of the ionosphere. First, different energies of the solar spectrum reach 
different height based on atmospheric absorption. Second is the balance between two 
different processes; ionisation and recombination (reverse process of ionisation) at different 
altitudes. At higher altitudes, more ionisation takes place while at lower altitudes more 
recombination occurs as the atmosphere is denser. Another factor is the atmospheric 
composition which is varies with the altitudes [Tascione, 2010]. As a result of a combination 
of factors mentioned above, the vertical structure of the ionosphere then can be defined by 
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four main layers known as D, E, F1 and F2 [Hargreaves, 1992]. Figure 3.1 illustrates the 
vertical structure of the ionosphere, and it variation with time of day and solar activity. 
 
Figure 3.1 A vertical profile of the ionospheric electron concentration layers, at typical mid-
latitudes daytime and nighttime. The changes are also affected by sunspot cycle as dashed lines 
indicate the profile during solar minimum while solid line during solar maximum [M.J et al., 
2013]. 
The four layers are identified as follows: The first layer is defined between 60 km and 90 km 
as the D region. The immediate layer above is the E layer, between 90 km to approximately 
140 km which covers the normal E layer and patches of sporadic E (Es), produced by solar 
soft X-rays. The next layer is the F layer which starts at 140 km and above, and is subdivided 
into F1 and F2 layers. This layer is produced by solar extreme ultraviolet light (EUV) where 
the peak electron density is found at F2 layer as indicated in Figure 3.1. Sir Edward 
Appleton discovered the F layer in 1925, thus the layer is known as the Appleton Region 
[Bennington, 1944]. On top of this F-peak electron density, exists the topside followed by the 
protonosphere or plasmaphere [Davies, 1990].  
Although all the ionospheric layers are present during the day time, only the F2 and E 
regions are maintained throughout the night [Tascione, 2010]. This is because the 
recombination of ions and electrons takes a longer time as the density decrease at higher 
altitudes.   
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The variability of the ionosphere is caused by a number of factors: the time of day, season, 
altitude, location (geographic and geomagnetic) and solar activity. For example, as shown in 
Figure 3.1, the electron densities at mid-latitudes during daytime and solar maximum are 
higher than the nighttime and solar minimum, respectively. Among those factors, solar 
activity has a large impact on the ionospheric region as there is more ionisation during this 
time causing the ionosphere to be thicker and denser, especially during the solar maximum 
of the 11-year solar cycle. However, solar radiation does not affect the ionosphere at all 
latitudes equally as the physics behind solar–terrestrial interactions is different at different 
latitudes.    
3.3 Ionosphere at Low Latitudes 
The equatorial region experiences the highest intensity of solar radiation. This means the 
ionosphere at equatorial latitudes hosts the largest electron or plasma densities during the 
day. The daytime thermosphere, undergoes diurnal tides that interact with the Earth’s 
eastward electric field [Kelley, 2009], forcing the equatorial plasma to drift upward from E-
region to F-region towards the magnetic field. This plasma is transported to even higher 
altitudes due to the E x B drift instability, where E refers the electric field and B the 
magnetic field intensity [Kelley, 2011]. As it moves upwards, gravity and plasma pressure 
gradients act on the uplifted plasma, dispersing it downward along the magnetic field lines to 
regions approximately ±15º about the geomagnetic equator (as shown in Figure 3.2). These 
bands, known as crests of the equatorial anomaly, contain the largest plasma densities found 




 [Aarons, 1982; Basu et 
al., 2002; Kintner et al., 2004; Kelley, 2009]. As post sunset is reached, the electric field is 
enhanced causing the F-region to move upward, gradually depleting the plasma from the 
lower altitudes. This leads to a phenomenon known as the Equatorial Spread F (ESF) [Huba 
et al., 2011]. The phenomenon occurs due to Rayleigh-Taylor instabilities, where small-scale 
irregularities and unusual large-scale structures of depletion called plasma bubbles form at 
the bottom of F region and percolate upward to high altitudes [Gwal et al., 2004; Saito and 
Fujii, 2010; Mitchell, 2013]. 
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Figure 3.2 A diagram of the equatorial electrodynamic and formation of the equatorial anomaly 
where plasma bubble occurs [Basu et al., 2002]. 
3.4 Effect on Radio Signals  
As radio signals travel from one medium to other medium, they can be reflected, refracted or 
diffracted. The same applies as radio signals propagate the ionosphere; the electron density 
of the medium has different effects depending on the frequency range. A lower frequency are 
refracted to the point of eventually being reflected back, while for higher frequency, less 
refraction is experienced, allowing signals in the upper frequency ranges to propagate 
through the ionosphere. As such, frequencies up to and including HF (3-30MHz) are 
reflected back to the earth, while for VHF signals in the range of 30-300MHz, the electron 
density allows certain signals to bounce back to the earth. This allows the propagation of sky 
waves that can travel long distances. In contrast, frequencies in the range of SHF (3-30GHz) 
and above, propagate through the ionosphere; which makes them important in applications 
such as satellite communication and navigation (GNSS) [Barclay, 2013]. However, the 
GNSS signals may experience refraction and diffraction when there are high electron 
densities in the ionosphere along the signals’ transmission paths.  
It is useful to explain this concept in general first before discussing its effect on GPS signals 
(see Section 3.6). Snell’s law states that refraction occurs when a wave enters a different 
medium causing a change in direction through bending of the signal. The change in angle is 
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dependent on the velocity of propagation in the two mediums. This law is commonly defined 




                                                                                                          (3.1) 
where c is the speed of light in vacuum and the v is propagation velocity of the wave in the 
medium [Bacon, 2013]. 
In the event of the signal diffraction, the signals are initially in a spatial uniform phase before 
entering the irregular region.  In this region, the signals become scattered whenever the scale 
length of the plasma irregularities are smaller than the Fresnel radius, which can be 
calculated using the following formula:  
         𝑟𝐹 = √2𝜆𝑑                                                                                                                  (3.2)                                   
where λ is the signal wavelength and 𝑑 denotes the vertical distance between the irregularity 
region and the receiver. This causes spatially irregular signal phases leaving the region 
which may combine either constructively or destructively to fluctuate the signal amplitude at 
the receiver [Kintner et al., 2007; Muella et al., 2010]. 
Propagating signals can be used to measure electron density, 𝑛𝑒 by using the Total Electron 
Content (TEC) – an integral measurement of electron density along a column of the unit 
cross section. For a signal transmitted by a satellite, this is the integration of the electron 
density along the signal path between satellite and receiver as shown in Equation (3.3): 
          𝑇𝐸𝐶 = ∫ 𝑛𝑒(𝑠)𝑑𝑠
𝑅
𝑆
                    (3.3) 




[Arbesser-Rastburg and Rogers, 2013]. 
A number of factors can influence radio signal propagation through ionosphere from satellite 
to receiver. Among the major factors are delay in the signal modulation (also known as 
group delay), carrier phase advance, Doppler shift, Faraday rotation, bending or refraction of 
radio wave, distortion of pulse waveforms and scintillations [Klobuchar, 1996]. As the 
scintillation is the focus of this research, more information can be found in the next section. 
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3.5 Ionospheric Scintillation  
As mention in Section 3.3, the small-scale irregularities and unusual large-scale structures of 
depletion called plasma bubbles may exist throughout the F region of the ionosphere, 
especially at the low latitudes of the Earth. At this region, ionospheric scintillation could 
happen. Ionospheric scintillation is defined as the rapid fluctuation of amplitude and/or phase 
of signals as they pass through plasma irregularities in the ionosphere. It is caused by 
refraction and diffraction processes as they propagate through regions of strong gradients 
and small-scale irregularities in the electron density [Aarons, 1982; Basu et al., 2002].  
3.5.1 Amplitude Scintillation 
A rapid enhancement and fading of signal amplitude as they propagate the ionosphere is 
known as amplitude scintillation [Aarons, 1982]. This is illustrated in Figure 3.3, where the 
L1 signal power from two GPS satellites are compared. The figure shows a strong 
scintillation event recorded at Cape Verde (located at 16.86ºN, 24.87ºW) on 18
th
 March 
2012. Strong amplitude fades were recorded for signal from PRN 6 (red) during the event, 
while no signal fluctuations experienced by PRN 11 (blue). Note that PRN 6 and PRN 11 
have elevation angles of 40º and 34º, respectively.  
 
Figure 3.3 Amplitude scintillation of recorded GPS signal at Cape Verde on 18 March 2012 for 
satellites PRN 6 (Elevation angle: 40º) and PRN 11 (Elevation angle: 34º) 
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The strength of amplitude scintillation is commonly identified by the S4 index. This is the 
standard deviation of the received signal intensity normalised by the average signal intensity 
of the signal over a defined period of time [Van-Dierendonck and Arbesser-Rastburg, 2004].  
The S4 index is defined mathematically in Equation (3.4). 
                  𝑆4 = √
〈𝐼2〉−〈𝐼〉2
⟨𝐼⟩2
                                                                                        (3.4) 
where I is the signal intensity, and <> represent time-averaged measurements. The S4 index 
is commonly computed over an interval of 60 seconds with the data measured at a sampling 
rate of 50 Hz.  Indeed, other methods can also be used to define scintillation index, however, 
the S4 index is one of the most widely used metrics by most researchers [Yeh and Liu, 1982]. 
Generally, an S4 index from 0 - 0.6 is classified as low to moderate scintillation, while an S4 
index greater than 0.6 (to the maximum of 1.4) is categorised as strong scintillation 
[Arbesser-Rastburg and Rogers, 2013]. At low latitude regions, high S4 values are seen more 
frequently compared to other latitudes as there is a high probability of experiencing severe 
amplitude scintillation due to the nature of the ionospheric structures in the region (e.g [Van-
Dierendonck and Arbesser-Rastburg, 2004; Gwal et al., 2006] ).  
Figure 3.4 plots the S4 index for the same PRNs (PRNs 6 and 11) shown in Figure 3.3. PRN 
6 (red) experienced a maximum S4 value of 1.2, while PRN 11 (blue) saw a maximum S4 
value of 0.4. This shows that the signal from PRN 6 propagated through plasma density 
irregularities before it was tracked by the receiver, whereas PRN 11 propagated through a 
relatively smoother ionosphere. The characteristic of scintillation is it is unique to each 
signal path. Therefore, two signals with different propagation paths to the same receiver will 




Figure 3.4 S4 index of two real scintillation events recorded at Cape Verde on 18 March 2012. 
3.5.2 Phase Scintillation 
Phase scintillation is the rapid fluctuation of the carrier phase of the propagating radio signal. 
Figure 3.5 shows a comparison of a scintillating and non-scintillating carrier phase of two 
GPS L1 signals. The signals were recorded at Tromsø located at 69.58ºN, 19.23ºE. 
 
Figure 3.5 Phase scintillation of recorded GPS signal at Tromsø. 
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The strength of phase scintillation is determined by the σϕ index, which is defined as the 
standard deviation of the detrended signal phase received from satellites. The calculation of 
σϕ is retrieved from raw data over 1, 3, 10, 30 and 60 seconds, every 60 seconds, and 
averaged over the 60-second interval [Van-Dierendonck et al., 1993; Van-Dierendonck and 
Arbesser-Rastburg, 2004]. 
3.6 Scintillation Effects on GPS 
Since the refraction and diffraction processes are the functions of frequency and electron 
density, different types and scales of irregularities affect the GPS signals differently. The 
refraction and diffraction processes in Section 3.4 and the formation of plasma irregularities 
in the low latitude explained in Section 3.3 are used to explain the scintillation effects on 
GPS. 
If the structures are small-scale irregularities (from meters to tens of kilometers) as formed in 
the low latitude ionosphere [Kelley, 2009] with respect to the signal frequency, the signal 
experiences diffractive scintillation as it passes through gradients in the irregularities. 
Consequently, this causes the GPS signals to experience amplitude scintillation. In contrast, 
the large scale structures (from tens of kilometers to hundreds of kilometers) with respect to 
signal frequency leads to refractive scintillation because of the variations in the refractive 
index as the electron density varies with the structure. This giving rise to largely phase 
scintillation which is more dominant at high latitudes as the large scale structure is highly 
formed there [Crane, 1977; Aarons, 1982; Yeh and Liu, 1982; Kintner et al., 2009; 
Priyadarshi, 2015]. Figure 3.6 illustrates how GPS signals can be disrupted by the high 




Figure 3.6 Radio waves such as GPS signals travel through disturbed layers of the ionosphere 
which produce scintillation [NASA, 2014]. 
Both types of scintillation could eventually lead to a loss of lock on the affected signal based 
on what type of scintillation experienced by the signal. As explained in Section 2.2.3, the 
GPS receiver may stop tracking the signal if the signal experiences deep fades and rapid 
changes. Severe amplitude and phase scintillation may affect GPS signals as follows: 
 Amplitude scintillation leading to deep fades therefore cause a signal loss of lock. 
 Phase scintillation leading to rapid changes in phases therefore the tracking loop of 
the receiver struggles to maintain lock and consequently cause a signal loss of lock. 
 




Figure 3.7 illustrates the concept of how different types of irregularities in the ionosphere 
introduce different scintillation processes on GPS signals as they propagate from the satellite 
to the receiver. As the figure shows, there is a large-scale irregularity patches along PRN 
14’s propagation path. This leads to refraction processes causing phase scintillation, and the 
eventual loss of lock. PRNs 1, 6 and 21 passing through small-scale irregularities that leads 
to amplitude scintillation due to diffraction which causes deep fades of the signal. In contrast 
PRNs 4 & 12 in this scenario could traverse and be received safely by the receiver as there 
are no any significant ionospheric irregularities. This highlights the characteristic of 
scintillation that it is unique to each signal’s propagation path, as it depends on the presence 
(and the nature) of the irregularities. Therefore, for a given receiver observing multiple 
satellites, there will be a combination of scintillation and non-scintillation signals received 
by the receiver. As GNSS navigation solutions require the lock of at least four signals, the 
effect from ionospheric scintillation even on a single satellite (in areas of the poor field of 
view) has the potential to influence the system performance [SBAS Ionospheric Working 
Group, 2010]. 
3.6.1 Scintillation Effects on GPS at Different Latitudes 
The regions of both low and high latitudes are major areas of GPS scintillation activity, 
while mid-latitudes may be exposed to scintillation during geomagnetic storms induced by 
space weather. This section describes GPS scintillation observed at these latitudes [Aarons, 
1982]. Figure 3.8 illustrates the regions of signal fading due to ionospheric scintillation 
during high and low solar activity [Basu et al., 2002]. 
 
Figure 3.8 The occurrence of GPS L-band scintillation reported during high and low solar 




Low latitudes are considered to be below 30º magnetic latitude for ionospheric purposes. As 
discussed in Section 3.3, the tropospheric tides and horizontal geomagnetic field lines at 
these latitudes have an enormous impact on the ionosphere [Kintner et al., 2007]. As shown 
in the Figure 3.8, severe scintillation of GPS is found at the equatorial anomaly around 15º 
north and south of the magnetic equator at post-sunset. Therefore, scintillation appears to be 
limited to local night time hours. Scintillation is high during equinoxes in September and 
March as the likelihood of plasma bubbles are higher for regions when there are parallel 
lines of magnetic and geographic longitude [Kintner, 2008]. As found by Dubey and Wahi, 
2005,  occurrence of scintillation has a seasonal variation where it is high during winter and 
low during summer months. Many researchers have observed very high scintillation during 
solar maximum of the 11-year solar sunspot cycle as this region experience the highest solar 
radiation compared to other regions. In these regions, amplitude scintillation is more 
prevalent compared to phase scintillation, although significant phase scintillation may be 
observed during very strong events.  Extensive studies on the equatorial scintillation at low 
latitudes have been conducted due to its important in GPS applications (e.g. [Gwal et al., 
2004; Dubey and Wahi, 2005]). 
Mid-Latitudes 
To explain GPS scintillation at middle latitudes, regions beyond the ionosphere should be 
taken into consideration. As far as space weather is concerned, the ionospheric dynamics are 
controlled by the inner magnetosphere and neutral winds [Kintner et al., 2007]. Thus 
scintillation occurring in these latitudes is usually an extension from the extreme occurrences 
of scintillation phenomena at low and high latitudes, thus is less intense than the latter 
regions. The other factor that is believed to cause scintillation at mid-latitudes is daytime 
intense of sporadic E which some believe may generate scintillation [Aarons, 1982]. 
High Latitudes 
As illustrated in Figure 3.8, high latitude regions are defined as above approximately 60º in 
the Northern and Southern hemispheres. Due to the fact that the ionosphere here is less dense 
compared to the equatorial or mid-latitudes during magnetic storms, it contributes less effect 
to high-frequency signals to operate [Kintner, 2008]. However, scintillation can be observed 
to accompany aurora at the north and the south with aurora borealis and aurora australis 
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respectively [Kinrade et al., 2012]. Scintillation at high latitude is strongly dependent on 
geomagnetic activity levels. In contrast to low latitudes, scintillation at high latitudes can 
occur during all seasons and is not restricted to local night time hours [SBAS Ionospheric 
Working Group, 2010]. 
3.6.2 Relation of Amplitude and Phase Scintillation to Carrier Frequency 
The strengths of amplitude and phase scintillation are related to the carrier frequency as 
shown in Equations (3.5) and (3.6) [Kaplan and Hegarty, 2006]. 
𝑆4 ∝  
1
𝑓1.5




                                 (3.6) 
From the above equations, it is possible to derive the relationship of amplitude and phase 
scintillation of L2 and L5 frequencies, to the amplitude and phase scintillation of the L1 
frequency. This is expressed as follows [Fremouw et al., 1978; Peng and Morton, 2011]: 





= 1.45 𝑆4(𝐿1)                          (3.7) 
𝜎∅(𝐿2) = 𝜎∅(𝐿1) [
𝑓𝐿1
𝑓𝐿2
] = 1.28 𝜎∅(𝐿1)                            (3.8) 





= 1.55 𝑆4(𝐿1)                          (3.9) 
𝜎∅(𝐿5) = 𝜎∅(𝐿1) [
𝑓𝐿1
𝑓𝐿5
] = 1.34 𝜎∅(𝐿1)                        (3.10) 
Equations (3.7) to (3.10) show that scintillation effects are greater at lower frequencies 
compared to higher frequencies. For example, amplitude and phase scintillation are 1.45 
times and 1.28 times stronger in L2 (respectively) than in L1. This vulnerability of the lower 
frequencies needs to be addressed in order to successfully use the signals for safety critical 
applications such as aviation. GPS mitigates this by transmitting L1, L2 and L5 signals with 
different signal structures and at different power levels. However, this means that the impact 
of scintillation on receiver operation when using a combination of the three frequencies is 
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not straightforward, and cannot be judged based only on the carrier frequency [Kaplan and 
Hegarty, 2006].  
3.7 Summary 
A focus has been given on the ionospheric scintillation effects on GPS receiver performance 
at low latitudes.  This concludes the chapter, which explored the ionosphere, and it effects on 
GPS, with a particular focus on ionospheric scintillation. The different mechanisms and 
characteristics of amplitude and phase scintillation of GPS signals were discussed, together 
with the occurrence of the two types of scintillation based on the geomagnetic locations 
(latitudes). The chapter also introduced the scintillation indices commonly used to measure 
the amplitude and phase scintillation strengths experienced by a given signal. It highlighted 
that the scintillation strengths on a signal varies with the frequency, with lower frequencies 
experiencing stronger scintillation higher frequencies – a characteristic that needs to be taken 
in to account when considering the impact on a multi-frequency GPS receiver such as those 
used in aviation. The next chapter discusses a systematic method for simulating ionospheric 




CHAPTER 4  
A NEW METHOD FOR SIMULATION OF IONOSPHERIC 
SCINTILLATION 
This chapter introduces a new method for the simulation of ionospheric scintillation by 
means of a Spirent simulator. The simulations focus on synthesising the effects of 
scintillation from the low latitude ionosphere which means mainly looking at the effects of 
amplitude scintillation. Section 4.1 introduces a GNSS simulation as a new method to test 
amplitude scintillation effects and diagrammatically demonstrates the process of simulations. 
Section 4.2 describes the preparation of scintillation effects derived from both real 
scintillation activity and artificial data that will be introduced into the simulation. Section 4.3 
provides guidance on the format of the input file needed for the Spirent simulator. Then, a 
detailed explanation on steps of creating a simulation scenario is given in Section 4.4. This is 
followed by Section 4.5 and 4.6 which provide information on the receivers and the 
parameters used for data analysis, respectively. A summary of this method is given in 
Section 4.7. 
4.1 Introduction 
The diffraction and refraction effects on GPS signals after propagation through the 
ionosphere can be seen in many previous extreme events recorded by scintillation receivers 
[e.g Van Dierendonck and Arbesser-Rastburg, 2004; Kinrade et al., 2012; Alfonsi et al., 
2011]. A number of studies have been conducted to investigate how these scintillation events 
affect the performance of GPS carrier tracking loops of a receiver. One of the methods used 
is field testing [e.g Carrano et al., 2005], a real-time method used to validate actual 
scintillation events and receiver performance. Obviously, this method does not allow the 
repeated controlled tests which are important for the understanding of receiver operation. 
Another approach of studies is the use of a software receiver. For example, Skone et al., 
[2005] investigated PLL performance using a software receiver and simulated ionospheric 
scintillation also in software using an intermediate frequency (IF) GPS software receiver. 
Even though this method is efficient, it covers only back-end processing and may avoid 
some of the important issues in the front-end processing of the receiver. Therefore this 
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approach is not necessarily beneficial for the testing of GPS receivers which are generally 
realised in hardware [Kintner et al., 2009]. 
Besides the above methods, there is an alternative method to test and investigate scintillation 
effects on receivers based on empirical or synthetic data, which is through GNSS simulation 
in hardware. A GNSS simulator is capable of emulating the environment of the receivers, 
transmitters, as well as the signal propagation path. It provides full user control on a date, 
time, location, vehicle motion, environment conditions and signal errors. The simulator also 
resolves the limitations of a live sky test where the unknown parameters can be avoided such 
as multipath and errors in satellite clocks, satellite orbit, navigation data, atmospheric and 
ionospheric. Moreover, it also enables receiver performance testing to be repeated under 
controlled laboratory conditions [Spirent Communications, 2010].  In this study, Spirent 
GSS6560 and GSS8000 simulators are used to investigate the ionospheric effects on the 
receivers by superimposing perturbations representing ionospheric scintillation onto the 
signals generated in the simulator. 
The simulation process, from preparation to observation, as used throughout this research, is 
shown in Figure 4.1. The following sections in this chapter explain each process in detail.  
 
Figure 4.1 Scintillation simulations with a Spirent simulator. 
4.2 Process 1: Generate Scintillation Effects 
In this study, sources of the signal perturbations to be introduced into simulator are either 
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through a computer program as artificial events. This section will first explain the process of 
extracting the effects of scintillation from real events and then describe how the effects can 
be generated by a computer program in Matlab. 
4.2.1 Real Events Selection 
The real scintillation events utilised in this study are based on data collected from the 
Septentrio PolaRxS GPS L1 (1,575.42 MHz) scintillation receiver located at Cape Verde 
(16.86ºN, 24.87ºW). The receiver which takes 50 GPS measurements per second, was 
deployed by the Invert group of the University of Bath in 2011, and the data from the 
receiver are available online for analysis [Invert Group]. It is expected to observe high 
amplitude scintillations over the period of the solar maximum as the location of the receiver 
is close to the magnetic equator. In the first step of the real events selection, amplitude 
scintillation experienced at Cape Verde were identified by observing the S4 index of 
ionospheric scintillation. The high S4 index periods at the start and the end of a satellite pass, 
and which repeats every 24 hours, were avoided as they are attributed to multipath effects at 
low elevations of the satellite. An example is shown in Figure 4.2 that highlight the rise and 
fall of a satellite pass for PRN 23.   
 
Figure 4.2 S4 index and sigma phi recorded by Septentrio PolaRxS GPS L1 in Cape Verde 
indicated PRN 23 (highlighted in bold blue) having a high S4 index at the start and end of pass, 
when the elevation angle is low. 
37 
 
Once suitable events are selected, they are classified into thr*ee different levels of high, 
moderate and low scintillation. Table 4.1 lists the levels of scintillation as defined in this 
study.  




High amplitude scintillation events at Cape Verde as classified under Level 5 and Level 6 in 
Table 4.1 are of particular interest for this study. Figure 4.3 shows an example of the S4 
index and sigma phi for PRN 6 having high S4 values from 02:00:00 to 03:00:00 UTC on 
18
th
 March 2012. More events of high amplitude scintillation during the solar cycle 24 from 
2011 through mid-2013 were identified by recording the date and time of the events.  
 
Figure 4.3 Example of selected plot of S4 index and sigma phi for PRN 6 from 02:00:00 to 
03:00:00 UTC on 18th March 2012. 
Classification Level S4 
Low 
Level 1 0 ≤ S4 ≤ 0.2 
Level 2 0.2 < S4 ≤ 0.4 
Medium 
Level 3 0.4 < S4 ≤ 0.6 
Level 4 0.6 < S4 ≤ 0.8 
High 
Level 5 0.8 < S4 ≤ 1.0 
Level 6 1.0 < S4 ≤ 1.4 
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Power and carrier phase of the selected events were then extracted from their raw data and 
sampled at 50 Hz which corresponds to the scintillation receiver sampling rate. The power 
was obtained by calculating 𝐼2 + 𝑄2, where I and Q are the in-phase and quadrature-phase 
signal power [Van-Dierendonck et al., 1993]. Meanwhile, carrier phase was obtained 
through the PLL which continuously attempts to track the incoming signal’s phase in the 
receiver [Gupta, 1975]. Figure 4.4 shows the received power and carrier phase of the 
example event selected above (from 02:00:00 to 03:00:00 UTC on 18
th
 March 2012). The 
rapid fluctuations and deep signal power fading seen in the figure are essentially the effect of 
ionospheric scintillation caused by refraction and diffraction processes. In this case, one such 
event has caused a cycle slip in the carrier phase as shown in the highlighted window. In 
order to extract the perturbation of the signals, a detrending process was applied to both 
power and phase of the received signal by filtering out the other signal components (i.e., 
satellite motion and multipath) not related to the scintillation effect [Van-Dierendonck et al., 
1993]. 
 
Figure 4.4 Received power and phase containing all signal components including the scintillation 
effect (from 02:00:00 to 03:00:00 UTC on 18th March 2012). 
Received power perturbations were extracted by first filtering the k
th
 received power 
measurement sample using a sixth-order low-pass Butterworth filter with cut-off frequency 
of 0.1 Hz. Then the k
th
 received power measurement sample was normalised by the filtered 








                                          (4.1) 
Meanwhile, scintillation-induced phase perturbations were isolated from the received carrier 
phase by means of a sixth-order high pass Butterworth filter, which removes all low-
frequency effects below its nominal frequency cut-off of 0.1 Hz  [Van-Dierendonck et al., 
1993]. The removed carrier phase changes are in part caused by the movement of satellites 
(i.e Doppler shift). Equation (4.2) expresses the detrended phase process: 
          𝑃ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒   𝑑𝑒𝑡 = 𝑃ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒   ℎ𝑝𝑓                                                                                           (4.2) 
The processed signal perturbations were then used to create effects on the signal in the 
simulator. In this section, two examples of high amplitude scintillation events experienced in 
Cape Verde are presented. The first event was selected from PRN 10 on 26
th
 September 2012 
21:14:00-21:16:00 UTC. Figure 4.5 shows the signal fading pattern and the related signal 
phase. Most of the scintillation events were found to show similar trends as this signal 
throughout the observations. The area enclosed by a box in the figure indicates the largest 
fades during this event with amplitude variations of 21.01 dB associated with half-cycle 
phase jumps. The phase values were in ranges of ±
𝜋
2
 rad which means 
𝜋
2
 was the limit value 
that can be achieved. This relationship between deep fades and a half-cycle phase jump is 
commonly observed and known as a canonical fade [Kintner et al., 2009].  
 
Figure 4.5 Amplitude fades and their relation to the signal phase of the selected real event on 26th 
September 2012 21:14:00-21:16:00 UTC. 
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The second event indicated a loss of lock which means the signal intensity dropped below 
the minimum C/N0 threshold permitted for tracking. This second event shown in Figure 4.6, 
was obtained on 18
th
 March 2012 2:13:00-2:16:00 UTC from PRN 6. The first highlighted 
area in the figure shows first largest fades of 24.25 dB. At this point, the receiver was still 
able to lock to the signal as the fade depth did not exceed the threshold value of the receiver. 
The second highlighted area shows the loss of lock during 12 seconds, associated with a 
cycle slip. As the fade depth dropped to low signal amplitude (below a threshold value) for a 
longer time, the receiver tracking loops were more likely to fail. This caused the loss of lock 
at a certain moment and it was re-acquired once the appropriate signal amplitude was 
achieved. 
 
Figure 4.6 Event consists of deep fades, loss of lock and cycle slip selected from a real event on 
18th March 2012 2:13:00-2:15:00 UTC. 
These selected perturbations need to be translated to a file format which the Spirent 
simulator can understand, so that it can be superimposes on the nominal GPS signals. This 




4.2.2 Artificial Data 
Before implementing real scintillation effects into the simulator, artificial effects imitating 
real scintillation events were first used to perform a systematic study on the effect of 
equatorial scintillation on receivers. This section will be further explained in other chapters 
where artificial data were used as an input to the simulator. 
4.3 Process 2: Construction of a User Command Define (UCD) file 
In order to allow the scintillation-induced signal perturbations to be introduced into the 
simulator, the signal perturbations need to be formatted as a User Command Define (UCD) 
file, a Spirent specific file format that can be provided as an input to the simulator.  The 
simulator allows modification on signal level, carrier and code using a UCD file, which is a 
text file with the *.ucd extension. The modification can be applied either to a single or to 
multiple GNSS signals in the constellation. Below are the format and a short sample of a 
UCD file. Details of the format for each parameter are defined in Appendix A. In the 
example below, the data is sampled at the intervals of 0.02 seconds, and the first line 
produces a 0.138 dB increase in level, a 0.021 m decrease in carrier and a 0.005 m increase 










The UCD file was then loaded into the simulator to allow scintillation effects to be 
superimposed onto the GPS signals generated by the Spirent simulator. In the simulation 
scenarios used in this study, the perturbations in the UCD file are set to start after 10 minutes 
quiet time. This will allow the receiver to first acquire and track, and thus lock on to all 
signals from satellites in view before the perturbations start. After that the simulator 
superimposes the perturbations on the nominal GPS signals as described in Section 4.1.  
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4.4 Process 3: Create a Scenario and Simulate with the Spirent Simulator 
The entire study used the Spirent GSS6560 and GSS8000-series signal generators which are 
pre-installed with Spirent’s SimGEN for Windows® software suite [Spirent Communication 
plc, 2016a]. The GSS6560 signal generator can produce 12 independent channels 
representing the GPS L1 C/A signals. It also supports SBAS signals such as the Wide Area 
Augmentation System (WAAS). The GSS8000-series, on the other hand, is a more advanced 
signal generator which is capable of providing the new GNSS signals from Galileo (E1, E5, 
E6), GLONASS (L1, L2), BeiDou (B1, B2) in addition to GPS (L1, L2, L5) and SBAS (L1, 
L5). The detailed specifications for both signal generators can be found in the Spirent 
documents [Spirent Communications plc, 2015]. Figure 4.7 shows a picture of the Spirent 
GSS8000 signal generator. 
 
Figure 4.7 Spirent GSS8000 signal generator. 
SimGEN’s capability of creating changing effects on the signal allows receiver performance 
to be analysed in a repeatable controlled environment. Figure 4.8 shows the default 
SimGEN’s interface displaying scenario contents, vehicle dynamics, date/time, power level 
graph, sky plot, ground track and system messages windows.  When setting up a simulation, 
some parameters need to be pre-defined in the software to create a scenario. Steps in the 














The first step in a simulation process was to create a new scenario by giving a unique 
filename. SimGEN allows users to use default parameters or make changes to these 
parameters depending on to the user’s requirement. Figure 4.10 shows the scenario contents 
window with some of the main parameters displayed.  
 
Figure 4.10 Scenario contents window. 
4.4.2 Date/Time/Duration 
            
Figure 4.11 Start time and duration window. 
The start date and time (in UTC) of the scenario were set to the date and time at which the 
simulation is intended to happen. This can be at any point in the past, present or even in 
future. As the start time was selected, SimGEN automatically changes the start time in GPS 
format (e.g. GPS week number, TOW). Duration of the scenario was set so that simulation 
will only run within that period. Figure 4.11 shows the Start time and duration window. 
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4.4.3 GPS Constellation 
Almanac data from the real-world was used in every scenario to specify the GPS 
constellation. First, the almanac data for the required day was downloaded from the relevant 
website [United States Coast Guard, 2017], and then loaded on to the simulator in the Yuma 
date format, which is one of the file formats describing orbital data for satellites other than 
Rinex and SEM format. The satellite's position in the sky plot was then updated based on the 




Figure 4.12 GPS signal sources window is selected from GPS constellation in the scenario contents 
window. A Load orbit from file button is clicked to load a Yuma file. 
4.4.4 Static/Other type of Vehicle 
     
Figure 4.13 New vehicle window to select the vehicle type. 
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SimGEN allows the users to select either a static or other type of vehicle such as a simple 
motion model, aircraft, land vehicle, ship, spacecraft and remote motion. This study uses 
static vehicle and aircraft modes as the selected vehicle in the scenarios. New vehicle 
window in Figure 4.13 is used to select the vehicle type. 
4.4.5 Vehicle Antenna Position 
The simulated antenna position was set depending on the vehicle type. To determine the 
position of the antenna on a static vehicle, latitude and longitude of the location of interest 
were specified together with the height and heading of mount antenna as in Figure 4.14. For 
a moving vehicle (e.g. an aircraft), the antenna position was determined by the vehicle 
position in the command file, as will be explained in Section 4.4.7. 
          
Figure 4.14 Initial reference indicates antenna position on a static vehicle. 
4.4.6 Waypoints in a Command File for Aircraft Simulation 
The Aircraft command file describes the sequence of aircraft manoeuvres. The first line in 
the command file is a reference command which defines the initial position of the aircraft, 
and the heading and speed for the start of any particular scenario. Other commands such as 
accelerate, decelerate, halt, straight, climb, turn and waypoint were then added to the list to 
create a complete sequence of aircraft manoeuvres. Further explanation will be described in 
other chapters where aircraft scenario is used in a case study. 
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4.4.7 Antenna Pattern 
The default receiver antenna pattern was set to isotropic (zero attenuation) resulting in equal 
gain in all directions. To simulate real aircraft motion scenarios, antenna patterns need to be 
defined that will respond to the orientation of the aircraft.  After enabling the antenna 
pattern, the Antenna Pattern Editor was updated with the gain values for the antenna in the 
azimuth and elevation ranges provided.  In the editor, negative numbers indicate 
amplification, while positive numbers indicate attenuation. Further explanation will be 
described in other chapters where the antenna pattern simulation is enabled in a case study. 
            
Figure 4.15 Power Levels Graph. 
Note that, for all Spirent’s signal generators, there are specific signal ranges which can be 
applied. For Spirent GSS6560 signal generator, the upper limit is set to be +15 dB and lower 
limit is -49 dB, while for and GSS8000-series signal generator, the upper limit is higher 
which is +20 dB and lower limit is -49 dB [Spirent Communication plc, 2016a]. This allows 
changes or variation of signal strength during the simulation which may be set from global 
offset or varies due to antenna gain and signal level fluctuation in the UCD file. 
4.4.8 Other Signal Types 
Besides having only GPS L1 signals in the constellation, SimGEN allows other signals to be 
used in the same scenario. For example, while simulating the aircraft scenario, GPS L5 can 
be added to allow frequency diversity. Or, when simulating the aircraft with SBAS in the 




Figure 4.16 The Signal type window allows different signals to be selected. 
Note that, the power level reference will depend on the selected carrier frequency. For 
example, if GPS L1 is selected, the reference level is -130 dBm (-160 dBW), but if GPS L5 
is selected, the reference level is -127.9 dBm (-157.9 dBW). Figure 4.17 shows the Power 
Levels Graph windows for the L1 and L5 signals with the different reference levels. 
               
Figure 4.17 Power Levels Graph for GPS L1 and L5. 
The signal-level characteristics of all carrier frequencies can be controlled by changing the 
values in the dialog shows in Figure 3.18. For example, an offset for all frequencies was set 
by default to be 10 dB. This global offsets is defined with respect to the reference level. 
Therefore, the signal power for L1 signal with reference level of -130 dBm (-160 dBW) will 




Figure 4.18 Changing the global offset of the signal power. 
4.4.9 Scintillation Effects using the User Command Defined (UCD) file 
In this simulation, scintillation-induced signal perturbations were introduced through a UCD 
file. The UCD file prepared in Section 3.3 was selected before running the simulation, 
enabling the scintillation signature to be superimposed onto the nominal GPS signal.  
 




4.4.10 Logging File 
A large amount of data produced by the simulator can be logged in a *.csv file format via the 
SimGEN software. Parameters to be logged need to be selected before running the 
simulation. This allows data to be analysed after the simulation. 
4.5 Process 4: Receive and Log Data with a GPS Receiver 
The GPS receiver that is connected to the simulator receives satellite signals from the 
simulator output via a coaxial cable. The receivers used in this study are the Septentrio 
PolaRxS and the Garmin 480, which are geodetic and aviation receivers, respectively. The 
performance of both receivers when experiencing amplitude scintillation was investigated 
through scenarios generated by the simulator.  
4.5.1 Septentrio PolaRxS Receiver 
The effects of amplitude scintillation on the geodetic Septentrio PolaRxS receiver identical 
to the one deployed in Cape Verde were investigated. The geodetic receiver is used as a 
baseline to allow pre-recorded output to be simulated representing real life events. The 
Septentrio PolaRxS is a multi-frequency multi-constellation receiver designed for space 
weather applications and ionospheric monitoring. The receiver is equipped with its own 
software, RxTools which allows users to fully control, monitor, log, convert and analyse data 
efficiently.   
 
Figure 4.20 Septentrio PolaRxS receiver. 
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4.5.2 Garmin 480 Aviation Receiver 
The Garmin 480 aviation receiver is a GPS/WAAS receiver designed to be installed in an 
aeroplane. The different features between this aviation receiver and a geodetic receiver is 
this receiver supports different flight operations such as oceanic/remote, en-route, terminal, 
departure, non-precision approach, LNAV/VNAV precision approach, LPV (also known as 
APV-II) precision approach, and GLS precision approach. This allows users to switch from 
one operation to others depending on the flight path. The receiver is capable of supporting 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Technical Standard Orders (TSO) C145a andC146a, 
Classes 1, 2 and 3 [Garmin, 2005]. 
           
Figure 4.21 Garmin 480 aviation receiver. 
4.6 Process 5: Analyse Receiver Output Data 
To analyse the receiver performance, a number of parameters were observed and recorded 
from the receiver’s output during simulation. The first parameter of interest is the tracking 
status of each satellite’s signal which indicates if the satellite is available and is used for the 
navigation solution. The C/N0 is a parameter which characterises the quality of the received 
signals of each of the available satellites and is expressed in dB-Hz. To determine the 
accuracy of the navigation solution based on the satellite geometry, GDOP was observed to 
have an acceptable value of 6 or less. Lower GDOP values indicate better satellite geometry. 
The position obtained from the receiver’s output was compared with the real position from 
the simulator by looking at the latitude, longitude and altitude. Errors in position when 
perturbations were introduced were calculated from the difference between the output 
position in the normal (i.e without perturbations) scenario and output position in the scenario 
with perturbations.    
Integrity performance, especially important for an aviation receiver, was inspected to ensure 
that the position solution could be trusted by the system. An alarm that is raised when the 
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system should not be trusted was observed from the value of Horizontal/Vertical Protection 
Level (H/VPL) when exceeded Horizontal/Vertical Alarm Limit (H/VAL) [Kaplan and 
Hegarty, 2006]. H/VPL defines the radius of a circle in the local horizontal/vertical plane 
where position integrity is guaranteed. The receiver computed H/VPL from the satellite 
geometry and the assumed measurement statistics.  
4.7 Summary 
The process of simulating amplitude scintillation using the Spirent simulator was explained 
in steps starting from preparing the scintillation effects from both real events and artificial 
data. Data from real events was detrended to extract the real scintillation effects. This step 
was followed by constructing a UCD file, thereby creating a scenario in the Spirent simulator 
and observing the parameter outputs. The simulation method explained in this chapter was 
used throughout the study, by changing parameters and setting within the simulator 






CHAPTER 5  
FADING DEPTHS AND LOSS OF LOCK 
This chapter aims to improve understanding of receiver responses to different levels and 
characteristics of amplitude scintillation. A systematic analysis through simulations is 
introduced to investigate how depth and duration of a fade may cause GPS receivers to lose 
lock on the signal. The presented results demonstrate the performance of geodetic and 
aviation receivers when experiencing different levels of fades.  
5.1 Introduction 
A receiver response to the ionospheric scintillation is critically depending on its tracking 
loop performance as mention in Section 2.2.3. This can be analysed from the occurrence of 
signal loss of lock following the ionospheric scintillation events. More studies are now being 
conducted to examine the behaviour of receivers during scintillation using GNSS simulators. 
Dautermann, Sgammini and Pullen [2013]  investigated receiver performance by simulating 
different ionospheric threats at mid-latitude. On the other hand, Hinks et al., [2008] 
evaluated receiver performance by developing a statistical model that recreates effects of 
deep amplitude fades and abrupt phase variations, and then incorporates the model into the 
output of GPS signal simulator.  In the research presented here, a new method was 
established that differs from using a statistical model to analyse GPS L1 receiver 
performance under scintillation conditions. The method is based on a systematic analysis of 
the receiver performance in response to different fade depths and durations representing 
simplified versions of signal perturbations. These artificial scintillation profiles were 
superimposed onto the simulated signal to observe the receiver performance of the geodetic 
Septentrio PolaRxS receiver, followed by the Garmin 480 aviation receiver. The receivers’ 
responses to perturbed signal conditions were characterised in terms of their probability to 
lose lock as a function of fade depth and duration.   
Part of the results in this chapter were presented at the ION GNSS+ 2014 meeting, and is 
published in [Pinto Jayawardena et al., 2014]. 
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5.2 Simulation Setup 
5.2.1 Preparation 
In this experiment, an artificial fading profile was used to represent scintillation as explained 
in Section 4.2. A cosine function describing a fade depth with fade durations from 1 to 512 
seconds was constructed at a sampling frequency of 50 Hz, which corresponds to the 
scintillation receiver sampling rate. Each fade depth instance was isolated from its adjacent 
fades by a 30-second interval with no scintillation, which is referred to as a quiet time. Its 
purpose is to allow the receiver to reacquire the signal after losing lock and to treat each fade 
duration independently. This profile was prepared for fade depths starting from 16 dB to 36 
dB producing a set of fade depth-durations profiles representing various ionospheric 
scintillation perturbations. 
The cosine function was chosen due to its similarity to typical scintillation fade events to a 
first order approximation; thus resulting in a set of fade depths-durations profiles that 
represent ionospheric scintillation perturbations. Another profile based on the square 
function was also constructed that has a complete signal drop, with the same specifications 
of fade depth-durations as with the cosine-based fade profile. This allowed specific analyses 
to be done on the effect of particular fade depth-durations on the receiver, without the effect 
of a gradual fade as seen with the cosine-based profiles. Figure 5.1 illustrates the fading 
profiles for both cosine and square functions at a fade depth of 24 dB for fade durations 
ranging from 1 to 512 seconds. Individual UCD files were prepared for each profile as 
explained in Section 4.3 by modifying signal level values which represented as sig_level 
in the UCD file to the power values in the profile. The timestamp in the UCD file which 
defined the time sequence was set to the duration of the profile with a sampling frequency of 
50 Hz. Note that the effects of the fading profiles on the receiver tracking performance were 
observed for only single GPS L1 signal by assigning parameter id in the UCD file to a 










Figure 5.1 Fading profile for the fade depth 24 dB of (a) Cosine wave profile and (b) Square wave 
profile. 
5.2.2 Simulation of Scintillation-Induced Fading  
A scenario to simulate these profiles was first created in the simulator as outlined in Section 
4.4. Date, time and duration for the scenario were set appropriately and a Yuma file 
describing the orbital data was loaded in the simulator. The location of a static antenna was 
specified to be placed at Cape Verde (16.86ºN, 24.87ºW) as this study concerns effects of 
ionospheric scintillation at low latitudes. The default omnidirectional antenna pattern was 
selected for the scenario. The profile’s UCD file, containing the offsets to the nominal signal 
levels of a single PRN having an elevation of 45º (i.e. rising), was selected before running 
the simulation. 
The simulation was set up as in Figure 4.1. The first experiment investigates the Septentrio 
PolaRxS receiver’s ability to lock to signals with fade patterns of cosine and square 
functions; representing perturbations of different fade depths and durations. The threshold 
value for the receiver was set to 0 dB-Hz so that the received signal with all C/N0 values can 
be tracked (or at least that tracking is attempted and not stopped by an artificial threshold in 




the software). Next, the experiment with the square function perturbations was repeated with 
the Garmin 480 receiver to observe the performance of an aviation receiver in a static (non-
moving) mode. Every single fade depth-duration was simulated 10 times for both receivers 
to derive the probability of loss of lock under varying fade conditions. 
5.3 Observations and Analysis 
An average C/N0 of 47 dB-Hz can be observed at the receiver once the nominal signal was 
tracked successfully. Once the signal perturbations were started, the effect of every single 
fade depth-duration (considered as individual events) on the receiver tracking performance 
was observed. If the receiver remains locked on the signal, it means that the particular fade 
depth-duration event does not affect the carrier tracking of the receiver. However, if the 
receiver loses its lock, that particular fade depth-duration has an effect on the receiver’s 
tracking capability. This effect was observed from the C/N0 and Doppler shift measured by 
the receiver. Figure 5.2 shows an example of C/N0 output recorded using Septentrio receiver 
when one of the fading profiles was introduced during the simulation. At certain fade depth-
duration, the receiver remains the lock while at the other fade depth-duration, the receiver 
may loses its lock. As each fade depth instance in the fading profile was isolated by a 30-
second interval of quiet time, the receiver manages to recover from the loss of lock just 
before its adjacent fades started. This output was analysed using SBF analyser from the 
Septentrio RxTools.   
  
Figure 5.2 C/N0 output recorded using the Septentrio receiver when of one of the fading profiles 
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5.3.1 Septentrio PolaRxS Receiver 
Figure 5.3 (a) and (b) show the results for the loss of lock tests repeated 10 times at each 
fade depth-duration combination with cosine and square function profiles, respectively. The 
probability of loss of lock was plotted as contour maps to analyse the receiver tracking 
performance. A probability of 1, shown in the colour bar of the contour map, corresponds to 
the receiver losing lock on every test. In contrast, a probability of 0 is obtained when the 
receiver successfully locks on to the signals of every test. The vertical axis of the contour 
maps indicates fade depths from 16 dB to 30 dB, while the horizontal axis indicates fade 
durations from 1 to 512 seconds. Results show that the fade depths which are smaller than 19 
dB has no effects on signal tracking for both profiles. A transition region between fade 
depths of 19 and 26 dB indicates tracking is uncertain, regardless of the fade durations. 
Another characteristic seen with both profiles is that longer fade durations for a given fade 
depth do not necessarily imply a higher probability of loss of lock. For instance, during fade 
duration 475 seconds for both profiles, a larger fade depth is required for the receiver to lose 
track of the satellite. In contrast, fade durations up to 400 seconds is more likely to lose lock 
at smaller fade depth. This anomalous result is as yet unexplained and requires further 







Figure 5.3 Probability of receiver losing lock of satellite for different fade depths and durations 
for (a) the cosine wave fade profile and (b) the square wave fade profile.  
Another observation from Figure 5.3 is that shorter fade durations have a more significant 
impact on that receiver’s tracking capability than longer fades. This is highlighted in Figure 
5.4 (a) and (b), where the receiver performance with both cosine and square profiles for 
smaller fade durations of 1 to 64 seconds is presented in more detail. The results show that 
with the cosine fade profile, the receiver successfully maintains acquisition and tracking of 
the GPS L1 signal for fade durations of up to 2 seconds. Beyond this, tracking becomes 
uncertain for fade durations of up to 6 seconds. For fades longer than 6 seconds, the receiver 
starts to completely lose lock at fade depths of 28 dB and above. In contrast, the square 
profile shows an uncertain tracking region for fades with a duration between 1 and 2 seconds 
when the receiver is trying to maintain lock, and completely loses lock after 2 seconds for 




(a)              
 
(b) 
Figure 5.4 Probability maps zoomed in to highlight features in receiver performance at smaller 
fade durations (1 to 64 seconds) for (a) the cosine wave fade profile and (b) the square wave fade 
profile. 
5.3.2 Garmin 480 Aviation Receiver 
The same scenario of square wave perturbations was simulated to observe the effects on an 
aviation receiver. Since the geodetic receiver’s tracking capability appeared to be more 
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significantly impacted at shorter fade durations, the square wave perturbations with fade 
durations from 1 to 64 seconds were carried out to investigate if the Garmin 480 aviation 
receiver has a similar response. The result of the probability of loss of lock is plotted in 
Figure 5.5. For fade depths smaller than 20 dB, the results reveal no effects on signal 
tracking for all fade durations except for the anomaly found at a fade duration of 55 seconds. 
The reason for the anomaly is as yet unclear. Small fade durations between 1 and 10 seconds 
shows a transition region for fade depths between 20 dB and 24 dB where the receiver 
appears to be struggling to maintain lock. Durations longer than 10 seconds have a high 
probability of losing lock for fade depths exceeding 22 dB.  
 
Figure 5.5 Probability of Garmin 480 receiver losing lock of satellite for a square wave fade 
profile.  
5.4 Discussion 
The performance of a GPS L1 geodetic receiver under simulations of two different profiles 
for the signal strength – cosine and square functions – was compared, having the same fade 
depths-durations. The threshold value of 19 dB observed for both cosine and square profile’s 
results with the Septentrio PolaRxS receiver indicated that the receiver has no problem with 
scintillation events having a fade depth of up to 19 dB at any durations. The receiver is 
capable of successfully tracking signals with a cosine fade profile that is very small durations 
(1-2 seconds) and depths of up to 30dB. In contrast, simulations with the square fade profile 
show that the receiver struggles to lock onto the signal even at these small durations. This 
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reveals that the Septentrio receiver may be vulnerable to lock with a complete signal drop 
than the gradually signal drop.   
Repeating the square fade profile with the Garmin 480 receiver showed that the aviation 
receiver is more sensitive than the geodetic receiver as the Garmin 480 completely lost lock 
at fades of 25 dB for all durations. Further, the anomalous loss of lock at the fade duration of 
55 seconds seen with the Garmin 480 was not observed with the geodetic Septentrio 
receiver; although this anomaly may be caused by internal receiver specifications, which are 
not revealed in this study. Both receivers indicated a clear transition region between 
successful tracking and loss of lock of the signal. 
5.5 Summary 
This chapter described the results of a systematic analysis of receiver performance under 
scintillation induced signal fading through simulation. The results showed that the shape, 
depth and duration of a fade profile have a significant impact on the receiver’s tracking 
capability. This method of systematic analysis through simulation revealed the capabilities of 
a geodetic and aviation receiver by clearly highlighting the depths and durations of fades 
which may probably cause a loss of lock on those receivers. The Septentrio receiver had 
more chances to lose lock onto the signals at small durations of square fade profile compared 
to the small durations of cosine profile. This reveals that the receiver may be vulnerable to 
lock with a complete signal drop than the gradually signal drop.  This study also found that 
the aviation receiver is more sensitive than the geodetic receiver as the Garmin receiver 
completely lost lock at fades of 25 dB even for very small durations. One of the most 
significant findings to emerge from this study is that there was a surprising loss of lock 
probability graph at the fade duration of 55 seconds retrieved from Garmin receiver. The 
results revealed that the fade depth of 18 dB could affect the signal tracking at this specific 
duration. The observations require further detailed analysis as some effects may be receiver-
specific and affected by the type of PLL used for signal acquisition and tracking. In order to 
understand receiver-specific behaviour, the procedure set up for both receivers may be 
repeated for a range of other GPS L1 receivers. Given the results of the systematic analysis 
on the aviation receiver, it is crucial to investigate how amplitude scintillation may affect 
aviation receiver performance, particularly during its critical applications such as aircraft 
approach and landing.   
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CHAPTER 6  
THE IMPORTANCE OF SATELLITE GEOMETRY AND FADING ON NON-
PRECISION APPROACH 
This chapter investigates the effects of fading on a GPS aviation receiver during simulated 
aircraft approaches. Two case studies were created, firstly to investigate the impact of 
temporary frequent fading on satellite availability and geometry (and hence GDOP). The 
second case study was to understand the effects of deep and long duration fades which 
threaten RAIM availability. An aircraft non-precision approach scenario was created using a 
GNSS simulator that is connected to a Garmin 480 aviation receiver. Precision, integrity and 
availability performances of the receiver were investigated.  
6.1 Introduction  
Deep and rapid signal fading caused by ionospheric irregularities, also known as amplitude 
scintillation is an important threat to all types of GNSS receivers. Aviation receivers are 
especially vulnerable due to the safety-critical nature of their application, particularly in 
equatorial regions during solar maximum (see Section 3.6.1 for more explanation). One of 
the serious concerns for aircraft navigation deploying GPS is that the amplitude scintillation 
during this time could further enhance and result in an increased probability of the receiver 
losing lock on single or even more satellite signals simultaneously. For example, Seo et al., 
[2009] reported an event where during 45 minutes of severe scintillation at Ascension Island 
in March 2001, almost all GPS satellites in view were affected. Consequently, such events 
contribute to high values in both GDOP and positioning errors which may lead to the 
uncertainty in the position solution of GNSS-aided aviation receivers.  
Most of the aircraft receivers are integrated with a system called RAIM. RAIM uses its own 
algorithm to monitor any failures in providing aircraft navigation solutions in real time. As it 
is not dependent on any additional ground and space integrity networks, RAIM is an efficient 




The simulation approach adopted here allows investigations to be done on an aviation 
receiver by creating a scenario with perturbations during different phases of flight, especially 
during a critical landing scenario. In this chapter, two case studies were constructed to 
investigate the effects of equatorial amplitude scintillation on the aircraft non-precision 
approach through simulations.  
The first case study in this chapter is to investigate the impact of fading with ranges of 
different durations on different satellites geometries (see Section 2.2 on using DOP to 
measure receiver’s position accuracy). Amplitude scintillation is applied to a combination of 
satellites - one with high elevation, one with low elevation, several satellites, and even all 
satellites simultaneously. The purpose of the simulations is to observe the receiver response 
when scintillation affects different satellites in view. The second case study is to understand 
the impact of fading with different depths and durations until RAIM is declared unavailable 
(see Section 2.3.1 for more explanation). Since severities of real amplitude scintillations are 
very unexpected and hard to predict, it is important to investigate at which depth and 
duration of fades may cause a receiver to lose lock on the signals and threaten the 
availability of RAIM. Therefore, using the method of simulation, RAIM performance can be 
investigated by simulating a scenario with severe perturbations.  
6.2 Simulation Setup 
To create a scenario of an aircraft landing approach with scintillation perturbations from the 
Spirent simulator, artificial profiles representing amplitude scintillations were first prepared 
as explained in Section 4.2.2. 
6.2.1 Case Study 1: Fading Affecting Satellite Geometry 
In this case study, a square function of 20 dB fade depth with duration of 30 seconds was 
constructed as in Figure 6.1 (a), to be introduced to the simulator. The fade depth and 
duration were chosen based on the result of the Garmin receiver’s probability of loss of lock 
obtained in the experiment discussed in Section 5.3.2. At this fade depth and duration, the 
Garmin receiver in a stationary condition was able to maintain lock for all 10 simulation tests 
when such a fade was introduced to a satellite located at high elevation. The main question 
posed here is: will similar perturbations affecting satellite geometry cause a problem to 











Figure 6.1 Fading profile for the fade depth of 20 dB for 30 seconds, a) single fade, b) rapid 
fading of 2-second with 4-second intervals, c) rapid fading of 1-second with 1-second intervals. 
66 
 
In a real scintillation scenario, the amplitude signal will fluctuate rapidly for a short duration. 
Kintner et al., [2007] statistically analysed the fading timescale from an example of 
amplitude scintillation event by normalised autocorrelation function for 40 seconds sample. 
The result revealed most of the characteristic timescales for the event were about 1 second, 
but then the timescale increased to up to 4 seconds. Therefore, in this case study, same fade 
profile as in Figure 6.1 (a) was constructed, but with rapid fluctuations to represent more 
realistic scintillation events. In Figure 6.1 (b), each 2-second fade depth instance is isolated 
from its adjacent fades by a 4-second interval with no fade (i.e. 4 seconds of normal signal 
strength); thus producing a rapidly fluctuating scintillation profile with repeated short 
duration fade depth instances. Additionally, a profile with a higher rate of fluctuations was 
created in Figure 6.1 (c) which each 1-second fade depth instance is isolated from its 
adjacent fades by a 1-second interval with no fade. This is to compare the receiver’s 
capability to lock with the 30 seconds fade duration, with and without rapid signal 
fluctuations.  All the artificial profiles were constructed at a sampling frequency of 50 Hz, 
which corresponds to the Novatel and Septentrio scintillation receiver sampling rate. 
The aim of this case study was to observe the effects on the Garmin receiver when the 
perturbation profiles were introduced on different satellites in the constellation during the 
aircraft’s approach phase. Therefore, each fading profile in Figure 6.1 was prepared to affect 
different satellites. The choice of satellites to which the profiles were introduced is discussed 
here: 
The lowest GDOP is achieved by having one satellite on zenith, and the other three satellites 
at low elevation angle which are equally spread out on the horizon [Parkinson, 1994]. One of 
the goals of this case study was to investigate the effects of amplitude scintillation on these 
four best satellites. Hence, the UCD files (explained in Section 4.3) were prepared to 
introduce fading profiles to the GPS best-set (all four best satellites simultaneously) which 
gives the lowest GDOP during the aircraft approaches. 
In the next stage, a scenario with only a single satellite from the best-set being affected by 
the perturbations was also considered. Here, a UCD file was introduced containing 
amplitude perturbations for a single satellite of the best set located at a low elevation angle. 




Finally, a worst case scenario was investigated where all satellites in view were affected by 
perturbations simultaneously, by preparing a UCD file introducing perturbations to all 
satellites in view.  
The different scenarios are summarised in Table 6.1.  
Table 6.1 Summary of different scenarios of fading affecting satellite geometry. 
Scenario Effected Satellites Fade Duration 
1 Best-Set of Satellite  
30 seconds 
(Single fade) 
as in Figure 6.1 (a) 
2 Low Elevation Satellite 
3 High Elevation Satellite 
4 All Satellites 
5 Best-Set of Satellite 
30 seconds 
(2-seconds with 4-seconds interval) 
as in Figure 6.1 (b) 
6 Low Elevation Satellite 
7 High Elevation Satellite 
8 All Satellites 
9 Best-Set of Satellite 
30 seconds 
(1-second with 1-second interval) 
as in Figure 6.1 (c) 
10 Low Elevation Satellite 
11 High Elevation Satellite 
12 All Satellites 
 
6.2.2 Case Study 2: Fading Threat on RAIM Performance 
RAIM algorithms can monitor the integrity for aircraft navigation as long as the position 
errors are within acceptable ranges. However, if the errors exceed the alarm limit, a warning 
flag is raised indicating that an aircraft should no longer rely on the navigation solutions (as 
explained in detail in Section 2.3.1). This second case study investigated the level of signal 
fading that reduces the availability of RAIM services, such that the service can no longer be 
trusted. Extreme scenarios were constructed by introducing perturbations affecting all 
satellites in view simultaneously. Square profiles with fade durations of 15, 30 and 60 
seconds at gradually increasing fade depth starting from 20 dB were prepared as the 
perturbation profiles. Figure 6.2 shows the example of a square profile with a fade depth of 
24 dB at the three different fade durations.  These profiles were used to identify the fade 
depth and duration which threaten RAIM availability. The UCD files prepared for the 













Table 6.2 Summary of different scenarios of fading threat on RAIM services. 
Scenario Fade Duration Fade Depth 
1 15 seconds as in Figure 6.2 (a) 
From 20 dB and increased gradually 
until affecting RAIM availability 
2 30 seconds as in Figure 6.2 (b) 
3 60 seconds as in Figure 6.2 (c) 
6.2.3 Aircraft Motion Simulation 
The first step in the simulation setup was to create a scenario for an aircraft approach in the 
Spirent SimGEN software. In this experiment, the aircraft was intended to land during the 
equinox and at a time when amplitude scintillation occurs frequently, (based on previous 
findings explained in Section 3.6.1). Consequently, this scenario was selected to take place 
during post-sunset (20:00 UTC) on 21
st
 March 2012. Almanac data describing the orbits of 
GPS satellites for the particular day was obtained from United States Coast Guard, [2017] 
and uploaded to the simulator (see Section 4.4.3 for more details). When simulating an 
aircraft scenario, several assumptions needed to be applied regarding the aircraft’s 
environment and its effects. In this simulation, an assumption was made that there are no 
obstructions by the aircraft body that cause signals to be blocked. Furthermore, the antenna 
was assumed to be located at the Centre of Gravity (CofG) of the aircraft body as shown in 
Figure 6.3. The Spirent GNSS constellation simulator defines zero degrees of both antenna 
azimuth and elevation (xa=0) to lie along xb, which is the aircraft x-axis.  
 
 
Figure 6.3 Location of antenna at centre of gravity (CofG) of the aircraft body. 
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In order to make the aircraft simulation more realistic, the aircraft’s antenna pattern was 
constructed in the Antenna Pattern Editor (Section 4.4.7) based on an actual L1 GPS antenna 
pattern. This antenna pattern, as discussed in Appendix B, was specified by ANTCOM 
Corporation, a manufacturer of GPS/GNSS aviation antennas. Figure 6.4 (a) shows the 
Antenna Pattern Editor in SimGEN software with updated data of gain values. As explained 
in Section 4.4.7, the negative numbers indicate amplification, while positive numbers 
indicate attenuation. The 3-dimensional representation of the antenna pattern with respect to 
elevation and azimuth is shown in Figure 6.4 (b). Consequently, the changes of power levels 
in the Power Levels Graph can be seen once the antenna gain is defined. This is shown in 
Figure 6.4 (d) which power level for each satellite varies based on its elevation and azimuth 
angles in the sky plot (Figure 6.4 (c)). 
   
(a)                                                                      (b) 
 
                             
                                   (c)                                                                (d) 
Figure 6.4 SimGEN windows of (a) Antenna Pattern Editor (b) 3D view of the antenna pattern (c) 
Skyplot of all GPS satellites in view during the simulations (d) Power Levels Graph shows the 
change in power levels as the antenna pattern was updated.  
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As mentioned in Section 4.4.6, the initial location, heading and speed for the aircraft moving 
scenario needs to be defined in the first line of the Aircraft Motion Command File as a 
Reference Command. The location for aircraft take-off and landing were selected to be in an 
equatorial region where amplitude scintillation is prevalent compared to other regions (see 
section 3.6.1). In this scenario, the latitude and longitude of Bamako Airport (12.54° N, 
7.95° W) were specified to be the initial location of aircraft’s take-off. After inserting 
Reference Command as the first line in Aircraft Motion Command File, the remaining 
commands describing aircraft manoeuvring from aircraft’s take-off until aircraft’s 
approaches were constructed as shown in Figure 6.5. Each command can be defined 
precisely either by time or distance properties related to the command. 
 
Figure 6.5 SimGen window of Aircraft Motion Command File. 
In the scenario constructed here, the non-precision approach of the aircraft without any 
perturbation was simulated as a reference. This is to compare and recognise the differences 
when perturbations were introduced to the same scenario. Then, the perturbations were 
introduced by superimposing amplitude fluctuations specified in the UCD file (constructed 
as in Section 4.2.1) onto the nominal GPS signals in the simulator. This scenario was 
repeated to simulate each UCD file created for the case study 1 (Section 6.2.1) and case 
study 2 (Section 6.2.2).   
During the flight approaches, the Flight Phase Command (AH Cmd) from the Garmin 
receiver interface was sent to modify the current Flight Phase to Non-Precision Approach as 
shown in Figure 6.6. By sending this command, the value for the mask angle, Horizontal 
Alarm Limit (HAL) and Vertical Alarm Limit (VAL) was automatically reset, overriding 
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any previously set values.  In the case of a non-precision approach, the value for the mask 
angle, which is relative to the local horizontal plane is 5 degrees. This means that the 
receiver will only consider satellites with elevations angles which are above 5 degrees as 
valid in its position solution. The HAL, in this case, is 0.3 nmi (555.6 m) and VAL is not 
applicable as the non-precision approach does not provide vertical information. 
           
Figure 6.6 Garmin receiver interface of Flight Phase Command.  
6.3 Observation and Analysis 
Once a simulation is started, variations in GPS signal power levels can be observed due to 
the relative motion of the satellites and receiver. Figure 6.7 shows the SimGEN interface 
during one instance of the simulation of the aircraft dynamics. The screenshot was captured 
during a turning command (i.e changes in the aircraft heading) during the aircraft approach. 
In this example, as the antenna gain and phase centre is not the same in its variation across 
all angles of elevation and azimuth, a signal’s phase and power level will vary according 
from which direction a signal came. When there are no changes in the aircraft heading, the 
boresight of the receiving antenna is pointed to the zenith; thus resulting in signals from high 
elevation satellites being simulated with high power levels, while signals from low elevation 




Figure 6.7 SimGen window during aircraft turning command. 
Figure 6.8 and Figure 6.9 show the output C/N0 received from all satellites available in the 
sky plot and the altitude of the aircraft, respectively; both for the case where no perturbations 
were introduced. The data plotted were recorded from the Garmin receiver, from the time 
when the aircraft began to approach until it touched the ground.  
 




Figure 6.9 Altitude of the aircraft from cruising to landing (when no perturbations were 
introduced). 
Note that for the case when perturbations were introduced, the UCD file started after 
20:20:00 to avoid any effects of rolling or banking motion from the aircraft. 
6.3.1 Case Study 1: Fading Affecting Satellite Geometry 
When perturbations were introduced during aircraft approach at 20:22:00-20:22:30, it was 
observed that the signal power levels from the affected satellites dropped by the amount of 
fade depth for the period of fade duration that was introduced into the signals. Figure 6.10 
shows the sky plot and power level when 20 dB fade depth was introduced to all satellites in 
the GPS best-set simultaneously. The satellites in the best-set which gave the lowest GDOP 
at this time are PRN 29, 14, 21 and 2, with elevation angles of 60.7º, 27.1º, 5.6º, 9.2º, 
respectively. PRN 2 was selected as the single satellite to be affected from the best-set which 
is located at a low elevation angle, while PRN 29 was selected as a single satellite to be 







 (b)  
Figure 6.10 (a) Skyplot of all GPS satellites in view during the simulations, and the GPS best-set 
selected from the geometry that gives low GDOP (in white). (b) Power level graph when fades are 
introduced to the best-set.  
Results of Signals’ Loss of Lock 
For the different scenarios set in Table 6.1, the signals’ loss of lock results when 
perturbations of 20 dB fade depth were introduced for 30 seconds to different satellites in 
view are summarised in Table 6.3. 
Table 6.3 Result of signals loss of lock when perturbation of 20 dB fade depth for 30 seconds was 
introduced. 
Scenario Effected Satellites Fade Duration Loss of Lock 
1 Best-Set of Satellite 
30 seconds 
(Single fade) 
as in Figure 6.1 (a) 
PRN 2,21 
2 PRN 2 (Low Elevation) PRN 2 
3 PRN 29 (High Elevation) No Loss of Lock 
4 All Satellites PRN 2 




as in Figure 6.1 (b) 
PRN 2,21 
6 PRN 2 (Low Elevation) PRN 2 
7 PRN 29 (High Elevation) No Loss of Lock 
8 All Satellites PRN 2 




as in Figure 6.1 (c) 
PRN 2 
10 PRN 2 (Low Elevation) PRN 2 
11 PRN 29 (High Elevation) No Loss of Lock 
12 All Satellites PRN 2 
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The results show that each time perturbations were introduced to PRN 2, receiver lost lock 
on the signal. This is because PRN 2 was already the weakest signal due to its low elevation 
angle. There were no effects of loss of lock when perturbations were introduced to PRN 29 
only. This is because PRN 29 is a strong signal due to its high elevation angle in the sky. 
When perturbations of a single fade and 2-second with 4-second interval fade durations were 
introduced to all satellites in the GPS best set, the two low elevation satellites (PRN 2 & 21) 
lost lock. Meanwhile, only PRN 2 lost lock in the case of 1-second with 1-second interval 
fade durations. However, when perturbations were introduced to all satellites simultaneously, 
the receiver only lost lock on the signal from PRN 2. 
Results of Precision and Integrity  
In order to analyse perturbation effects on precision and integrity of the solution from the 
aviation receiver, the GDOP and HPL retrieved from the receiver were plotted as shown in 
Figure 6.11 and Figure 6.12, respectively. The three different plots for each GDOP and HPL 
are for 20 dB fade depth introduced to a single fade of 30 seconds fade duration, rapid fade 
fluctuations with 2-second fades separated by 4-second intervals, and rapid fade fluctuations 
of 1-second fades separated by 1-second intervals. The green marker represents the 
simulation without any perturbations which acted as a reference to compare against the fades 
simulations.  
Figure 6.11 (a) compares the GDOP for a simulation without any perturbations and when a 
single fade of 30 seconds duration was introduced to all satellites (in view), best-set, PRN 29 
(high elevation satellite) and PRN 2 (low elevation satellite). Note that the reference level for 
the GDOP is when there were no perturbations introduced during the simulation, which in 
this case is 1.7. It can be seen that introducing fades on the best-set gave a maximum GDOP 
of 2.6 at one instance during the perturbation period. For the rest of the perturbation period, 
the scenario with fades on the best-set has the same GDOP as the scenario of fade on PRN 2 
which is 2.1. When fading was introduced to all satellites, the GDOP rose to 2.1 during one 
instance (at minute 22 and 6 seconds). Also, note that this single fade of 30 seconds duration 
on the best set, and PRN 2 allowed the GDOP to return to its original value. No changes 




As the perturbations became rapid (Figure 6.11 (b)), the maximum value of GDOP was 2.1; 
which was observed when fading was introduced to PRN 2. Fades on all satellites and fades 
on the best-set were less likely to affect the GDOP as only at one or two instances, the 
GDOP was higher compared to a simulation without any perturbations. Meanwhile, when 
more rapid fade fluctuations were introduced (Figure 6.11 (c)), stronger effects on GDOP 
were seen for fades introduced to the best set, as well as fades on PRN 2, giving a maximum 









Figure 6.11 Result of GDOPs when 20 dB fade depth was introduced for 30 seconds, a) single 
fade, b) rapid fade of 2 sec with 4 sec intervals, b) rapid fade of 1 sec with 1 sec interval. 
The measurement geometry is one of the input parameters for RAIM algorithm. Due to that, 
the best output of the algorithm can be achieved if there is better accuracy in satellite Signal-
in-Space (SIS) and more redundancy which leads to smaller values of HPL. Figure 6.12 
shows the results for HPL. HPL, as defined in Section 2.3.1 determines the radius of a circle 
in a local horizontal plane where position integrity is guaranteed. Figure 6.12 (a) compares 
the HPL for a simulation without any perturbations and when a single fade of 30 seconds 
duration was introduced to all satellites (in view), best-set, PRN 29 (high elevation satellite) 
and PRN 2 (low elevation satellite).  The results show that fades on both the best-set and on 
PRN 2 reached an HPL of 55 meters. For rapid fades in Figure 6.12 (b), the fades on PRN 2 
gave an HPL value of 55 meters. Meanwhile, for the more rapid fade scenario (i.e 1-second 
fades with 1-second intervals), the fades on the best-set gave the highest value of HPL 
during the perturbations. For all scenarios, only very small changes were seen in the HPL 
when fades were introduced to all satellites, while no changes on HPL were observed when 








Figure 6.12 Result of HPLs when 20 dB fade depth was introduced for 30 seconds, a) single fade, 
b) rapid fade of 2 sec with 4 sec intervals, b) rapid fade of 1 sec with 1 sec interval. 
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6.3.2 Case Study 2: Fading Threat on RAIM Performance 
The effects of fading on RAIM performance in the presence of square function fade profiles 
with durations of 15, 30 and 60 seconds during the aircraft’s non-precision approach are 
summarised in Table 6.4. The maximum position errors, and GDOP, RAIM output, the 
number of satellites losing lock and the available satellites were recorded from the receiver 
for different fade depth scenarios at each fade duration. Note that the maximum position 
errors (latitude/longitude and altitude) in the results were derived from latitude/longitude and 
altitude differences between a simulation with perturbation and without perturbation. The 
distance (lat1, lon1, lat2, and lon2) function in Matlab was used to computes the distance 
between the two latitude and longitude points. RAIM is defined to be available if the HPL is 
less than HAL. As the scenario was simulated during the aircraft non-precision approach, 
HAL was defined to be 0.3 nmi, which is equivalent to 555.6 m [Garmin, 2005]. The loss of 
lock and visible satellites were observed and recorded during the time of the maximum (i.e 
worst) GDOP. 
From Table 6.4, the results show a 24 dB fade depth is the threshold for RAIM availability at 
all fade durations. When the depth is increased to 25 dB fade, the service became unavailable 
as the receiver lost lock on most of the satellites. Although a fade on 24 dB was identified as 
the maximum fade under which RAIM is available, a fade depth of 30 dB was also simulated 
to observe the effects of extreme perturbations, which caused all satellites to lose lock 










Table 6.4 Simulation result for fade duration 15, 30, and 60 seconds. 
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As explained in Section 2.3.1, RAIM availability is dependent on the number of the visible 
satellites and the measurement geometry. It requires a minimum number of satellites to be 5 
in view and while having a good GDOP (i.e less than 6). The results in Table 6.4 show that, 
at a 24 dB fade depth, even when the maximum GDOP is more than 6, the service was still 
declared to be available. This may be due to the number of visible satellites as seen by the 
receiver is more than 5, although more investigation is required to confirm the cause for the 
availability of RAIM services in this case. 
From Table 6.4, it can be seen that as the fade depth was increased from 24 dB to 30 dB for 
the three fade duration scenarios, the maximum position errors and GDOP were increased. 
Furthermore, at a fade depth of 30 dB for all scenarios, the simultaneous deep fades caused 
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all signals to drop and the receiver lost lock on all available signals.  However, for some 
cases (e.g fade with depths of 30 dB and durations of 15 seconds), the position errors and 
GDOP did not increase to an unacceptable number, although the RAIM alarm was triggered 
one second after the perturbations to indicate that the navigation solutions are not reliable. 
Noteworthy is that the latency between introducing the fades and the RAIM alarm being 
triggered is longer than the time of fade duration itself. This longer time of the unavailability 
of RAIM service may be due to the time required by the receiver to reacquire the lost 
signals.   
6.4 Discussion 
The first case study aims to observe an aviation receiver’s performance when single and 
rapid multiple fades with depths of 20 dB and durations of 30 seconds effect different 
satellites geometries. The results can be discussed as follows: 
 It is observed that the receiver’s ability to maintain a lock on low elevation satellites 
is challenged because they already have lower signal strength. Of particular 
importance is if these low elevations satellites are among the satellite best-set which 
gives a low GDOP. Results show that losing lock on the signals of these low 
elevation satellites within the best set can degrade precision and integrity of the 
navigation solution.   
 Another important observation is that perturbations on the best-set and perturbations 
on single low elevation satellites are more vulnerable compared to perturbations on 
all satellites simultaneously.  
 Furthermore, at the specific fade depth of 20 dB in this case study, a single long fade 
seems to affect integrity and precision more than multiple fades. This is because the 
longer duration of the fade can simply cause the receiver to lose lock on the signals 
and cannot acquire the signals sufficiently fast enough to contribute to the solution. 
Meanwhile, rapid fade can still allow the receiver to retain the signal to provide the 
PVT solution.  
 For all scenarios in the first case study, the HPL is far below the HAL which means 
the RAIM service can still be reliable.  
In the second case study, the effects of deep and long fading scales were investigated to 
identify at what fade duration and fade depth the RAIM service becomes unavailable. 
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Results show that navigation solutions can still be trusted as long as there are enough 
satellites in view to provide a good GDOP. As all the satellites have different power levels 
due to their position in the sky and the antenna pattern variations, the low elevation satellites 
have a high probability of losing lock from the receiver when strong fading was introduced 
to all satellites simultaneously (as seen in Table 6.3). The maximum acceptable fade depth 
for the three fade durations of 15, 30 and 60 seconds in this experiment was found to be 24 
dB. This is because, at a 24 dB fade depth, the receiver was still able to maintain the lock on 
most of the satellites in view and gave an acceptable GDOP for RAIM service to be 
available. An alarm was raised as soon as the receiver loses lock on most of the satellites 
which also increases the errors and GDOP.  Following the fade perturbations, the receiver 
was observed to take a significant time to resume tracking and provide an accurate solution 
that can re-enable the RAIM service for navigation.  
6.5 Summary 
This chapter has presented two case studies to investigate the importance of satellite 
geometry and fading on the aircraft non-precision approach. The first case study investigated 
the influence on the loss of lock, precision and integrity of the GPS receiver’s navigation 
solution (i.e crucial for aviation applications), when single and rapid multiple amplitude 
fades are introduced to the nominal signals for different satellite geometry.  Though the 
satellites at low elevation have already lower signal strength, perturbing the signals from 
satellites can even degrade precision and integrity of the navigation solution, especially when 
there are within the satellite best-set. At given fade depth, longer fade durations were 
observed to cause a receiver to lose lock on the signals compared to short rapid multiple 
fades, especially when the affected satellite is already at low elevation. In the second case 
study, the simulation of a worst case scenario consisting of an unacceptable strong fade 
showed that it may cause a failure of RAIM services. Although there are multiple GNSS 
constellations currently and a number of visible satellites will be increased in the future, this 
simulation which covers only GPS signals can still be reliable to predict RAIM performance 
for other GNSS constellation. The next chapter will be looking at the impact of real 





CHAPTER 7  
CHALLENGES IN OVERCOMING SEVERE AMPLITUDE 
SCINTILLATION  
The previous chapter demonstrated artificial scintillation effects during simulated aircraft 
approaches. In this chapter, real amplitude scintillation events are introduced during an 
aircraft simulation of turning and approaching a landing.  Real scintillation events collected 
from Cape Verde were scaled to represent severe amplitude scintillation events, and 
introduced to multiple satellites-in-view simultaneously through a Spirent simulator. The 
impact of these scintillation events on two different receivers, a Garmin 480 aviation 
receiver and a Septentrio PolaRxS geodetic receiver, were observed. Precision, integrity and 
availability performances of the two receivers were investigated.  
7.1 Introduction 
Currently, the effects of ionospheric scintillation on aviation receivers during solar maxima 
are not fully understood due to insufficient live-sky scintillation data captured [Seo et al., 
2011]. Therefore, more in-depth studies need to be done using a combination of real and 
artificial scintillation data in order to understand its impact on the receivers. If electron 
density irregularities cover a large portion of the sky, there is a chance that a receiver may 
lose lock on more than one satellite at a given time. Simultaneous loss of a significant 
number of satellites discontinues GPS navigation. Therefore, strong ionospheric scintillation 
could be hazardous to aviation in terms of continuity and availability of GPS-based 
navigation as aircraft require a high level of accuracy and integrity for safe operation. 
The objective of this chapter is to investigate the effects of real, captured scintillation 
profiles during aircraft turning and approach processes by recreating them in a Spirent 
simulator, taking into consideration of the following:  
 Using two selected events where scintillation profiles were extracted from real 
amplitude scintillation captured at Cape Verde 
 Scaled versions of the scintillation profiles with and without the signal 
enhancements  present in the profiles 
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The scintillation effects are observed on two different types of receivers; Garmin 480 
aviation receiver and the Septentrio PolaRxS geodetic receiver. 
7.2 Simulation Setup  
7.2.1 Preparation 
As this chapter involves implementing real amplitude scintillation events, the technique 
described in Section 4.2.1 is implemented to extract the scintillation profiles from real 
recorded events.  Two real events of amplitude scintillations from Cape Verde were 
identified by observing the S4 index of the data collected. Both events were selected around 
the equinox time, post sunset, and have instances of amplitude fading due to scintillation that 
do not cause the receiver to lose lock. From the two selected events, two-minute durations of 
amplitude scintillation profiles were extracted from the signal power to be introduced into 
the simulator, which is discussed later in this chapter. It must be noted that, while a duration 
of 2 minutes may be considered as short, the variation in signal power during this time was 
sufficient to observe significant effects on the GPS receivers.  
7.2.2 The Scintillation Case Studies 
The first scintillation event is the profile extracted from PRN 24 at 23:29:31 to 23:31:31 UT 
on 29
th
 February 2012. Figure 7.1 (a) shows the fade profile after detrending (refer to Section 
4.2.1 for the detrending method). This fade profile is characterised by the presence of a 
single deep fade of 19.2 dB at the end of the first minute, together with other minor fades of 
up to 5 dB.  
The second event was extracted from PRN 10 at 21:11:08 to 21:13:08 UT of 26
th
 September 
2012. This two-minute profile consists of several deeper and longer fades than Event 1, with 
the two largest fades being 14.8 dB and 18.1 dB and some of the smaller fades exceeding 5 




  (a) 
 
  (b) 
Figure 7.1 Selected amplitude scintillation events from recorded GPS signals at Cape Verde (a) 
29th February 2012 from 23:29:31 to 23:31:31 UT for satellites PRN 24, and (b) 26th September 
2012 from 21:11:08 to 21:13:08 UT for satellites PRN 10.   
7.2.3 Scintillation Profile Scaling 
In order to represent extreme events of amplitude scintillation in the simulations, the selected 
events in Section 7.2.2 were scaled to reach the maximum in the allowed range for signal 
power in the simulator; given the simulator has a specific signal power limits as described in 
Section 4.4.7. 
Scaling factors of 2 and 3 used to systematically increase the severity of scintillation in the 
two events. Figure 7.2 shows the scaled profiles together with the original unscaled 







Figure 7.2 Measured and scaled amplitude scintillation of recorded GPS signal at Cape Verde on 
(a) 29th February 2012 from 23:29:31 to 23:31:31 UT for satellites PRN 24, and (b) 26th 
September 2012 from 21:11:08 to 21:13:08 UT for satellites PRN 10.  
Table 7.1 summarises the maximum degradation of the signal power after scaling the 
original recorded scintillation profiles.     
Table 7.1 Summary of the maximum degradation of signal power for the two selected scintillation 
events. 
 Event 1: 29 February 2012 Event 2: 26 September 2012 
Measured 19.2 dB 18.1 dB  14.8 dB 
Scaled (x2) 38.4 dB 36.2 dB  29.7 dB 




It can be seen that, after scaling the scintillation profiles to represent severe amplitude 
scintillation (Figure 7.2), as the scaling was increased from a factor of 2 to 3, the positive 
fluctuations in the original signals power were also scaled to give stronger signal 
enhancements. However, an increase in the scintillation strength generally results in deeper 
fading rather than enhancements. Therefore, linear scaling cannot be applied directly to both 
the enhancements and the fading since adverse impact of scintillation on the receivers is 
usually associated with the signal fading. In order to observe its impact, the enhancements in 
the profiles were clipped to 0 dB, as shown in Figure 7.3 (this event is known as clipped 
event hereafter in this study). This is acceptable as, during very strong scintillation events, 
the enhancements generally did not exceed 5 dB, as observed in the real events captured at 
Cape Verde. Both unclipped and clipped versions of the events were then simulated to 





Figure 7.3 Measured, scaled and clipped (power values > 0 dB set to 0 dB) amplitude scintillation 
of recorded GPS signals at Cape Verde on (a) 29th February 2012 from 23:29:31 to 23:31:31 UT 
for satellites PRN 24, and (b) 26th September 2012 from 21:11:08 to 21:13:08 UT for satellites 
PRN 10.  
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7.2.4 Aircraft Motion Simulation 
The case studies discussed here were intended to investigate the effects of real scintillation 
events during two different manoeuvres: during aircraft turning and approach. The same 
aircraft scenario from the Spirent SimGEN software set up in Section 6.2.3 was used in this 
investigation.   
7.2.4.1  Case Study 1: Scintillation Events during an Aircraft Turning Scenario  
Aircraft turning is implemented in SimGEN using the command in the Aircraft Motion 
Command File (refer Section 4.4.6). It applies the manoeuvre by changing the heading and 
lateral acceleration of the aircraft.  The definition of this command is explained in the 
Spirent simGEN Software user manual as follows: 
This command changes the aircraft heading with a change in heading or direction and a 
lateral acceleration (in the horizontal plane) that, in turn, determines the rate of change of 
heading or direction. The duration of the manoeuvre depends on the aircraft speed during 
the manoeuvre; the manoeuvre maintains angular speed throughout the turn. The aircraft 
banks to achieve lateral acceleration. In this configuration, there is no sideslip. The lift force 
is perpendicular to the longitudinal plane of the aircraft, Spirent assume it passes through its 
centre of gravity. As the bank angle increases, the component of lift force in the horizontal 
plane also increases. The aircraft meets the lateral (horizontal) acceleration you specify by 
banking to a given angle [Spirent Communication plc, 2016a]. 
For the turning manoeuvre of this case study, the heading was set to change from the current 
heading value to -90º with a lateral acceleration of 0.5g. The complete scenario was run from 
20:05:00 to 20:25:00. The perturbations were introduced during the aircraft turning between 
20:19:14 and 20:21:14. Five out of a total of eleven satellites available were affected by the 
changes in aircraft heading or direction at this time. This can be seen as drop in the C/N0 of 
the five satellites with the changes in direction of the aircraft. In order to create a severe 
scintillation scenario, perturbations were introduced to the satellites which were not affected 
by the aircraft turning. Three out of six clear signals were perturbed by introducing the 




Figure 7.4 SimGen window during aircraft turning command. 
7.2.4.1 Case Study 2: Scintillation Events during an Aircraft Approach Scenario  
During approach, the height of the aircraft decreases. The command used to define the 
approach phase in SimGEN’s Aircraft Motion Command File is ‘Climb’, with a negative 
height change. Spirent SimGEN Software user manual defines Climb as follows: 
Use to change the height of the aircraft in terms of required height change, rate of change of 
height, and pitch acceleration at the start and end of the manoeuvre (you enter these pitch 
accelerations as lateral accelerations).The manoeuvre assumes the aircraft is at zero 
incidence with the aircraft velocity vector aligned along the longitudinal axis (no sideslip). 
Therefore, the elevation of the aircraft relates directly to the climb rate. The rate at which 
the aircraft attains the required elevation angle is proportional to the specified start 
acceleration, and similarly the rate at which the aircraft resumes straight and level flight at 
the end of the manoeuvre is proportional to the specified end acceleration. 
For this case study, the parameters for the approach manoeuvre were set as follows:  
 height change : -1200 m 
 height rate: 8 m/s 
 start of lateral acceleration : 1 g 
 end of lateral acceleration : 1.5 g 
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The complete scenario was run from 20:05:00 to 20:25:00. The perturbations were 
introduced during the aircraft approach phase between 20:21:30 and 20:23:30. In order to 
create a severe scintillation scenario, perturbations were introduced to all satellites in view 
during the approach. Note that this investigation was carried out for a non-precision 
approach, which provides only horizontal information for the navigation solution.  
The effects on the receiver performance for the two case studies were observed using an 
aviation and a geodetic receiver – Garmin 480 and Septentrio PolaRxS, respectively. The 
geodetic receiver was used to compare the results of the aviation receiver with the 
performance of a static receiver. 
7.3 Observation and Analysis 
The aircraft scenario was first simulated without any perturbations being introduced and the 
output was recorded by a receiver. This simulation was used as the reference against which 
any receiver effects due to simulations with perturbations were compared.  Figure 7.5 and 
Figure 7.6 show the altitude of the aircraft and the output C/N0 received from all satellites 
available in the sky plot, respectively. Both figures are for the reference simulation where no 
perturbations were introduced. The data plotted were recorded using the Garmin receiver, 
from when the aircraft began to approach until it touched down (landed).  
 
Figure 7.5 Altitude of the aircraft from cruising to landing that includes the manoeuvres turning 






































  Figure 7.6 C/N0 received from all satellites in view for the simulation with no perturbations. 
In Figure 7.5, the variations in height indicate that the aircraft is reducing its height as the 
aircraft approach a landing. The red and green dashed lines specify the two-minute duration 
for simulation with perturbations during aircraft turning and approach, respectively, which 
will be explained later. The C/N0 plotted in Figure 7.6 shows the variation in C/N0 associated 
with the sudden fluctuations (in circle) which occur each time the aircraft changing its 




Aircraft changing its direction 
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(b) 
Figure 7.7 C/N0 received from all satellites in view during simulation with no perturbations, 
zoomed in from Figure 7.6. to highlight C/N0 (a) during aircraft turning and (b) during aircraft 
approaching. 
Figure 7.7 (a) and (b) show the zoomed in of the C/N0 from Figure 7.6. They indicate the 
C/N0 for the two-minute duration specified for simulation with perturbations during aircraft 
turning and approach, respectively. Figure 7.7 (a) shows the PRNs affected due to 
obscuration of satellites by the aircraft during turning, therefore there are drop in C/N0. In 
contrast, this effect is not shown for C/N0 during the approach (Figure 7.7 (b)). 
Once the reference simulation was recorded, the scenario was run with perturbations 
included. As mentioned previously, a severe scintillation event was created to introduce 
perturbations to the selected satellites during aircraft turning. From Figure 7.7 (a), during the 
aircraft turning, PRNs 2, 12, 14, 21 and 22 were already affected (changes in C/N0) due to 
obscuration of satellites by the aircraft as the aircraft changed its heading. Six satellites 
(PRNs 9, 15, 18, 25, 27, 29) which maintained the C/N0 between 43 and 45 dB-Hz were not 
affected as the aircraft changing its direction. In this experiment, three out of these six 
satellites, namely, PRNs 15, 18 and 29, at elevation angles of 37º, 20º and 59º, respectively, 
were perturbed by introducing scintillation profiles as shown in Figure 7.8 (a). This is to 
observe the effects on the aircraft navigation solutions when signal strength is affected by a 
combination of fading due to shadowing or obscuration during heading change as well as 
due to ionospheric scintillation effects. In the case of the aircraft approach in Figure 7.7 (b), 
the different C/N0 for different PRNs are due to the position of the satellites with respect to 
the antenna pattern of the aircraft antenna. This experiment investigated the effects for 
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different scales of real events being introduced to all satellites during the aircraft non-
precision approach. Figure 7.8 plots the C/N0 of the scintillating signals fluctuating rapidly 





Figure 7.8 C/N0 received from all satellites in view (a) during aircraft turning and (b) during 
aircraft approaching. 
In order to analyse perturbation effects on precision and integrity solutions from the Garmin 
and Septentrio receivers, the GDOP and HPL parameters retrieved from both receivers were 
plotted. All figures in this section compare the GDOP and HPL for the following simulations 
in each figure: 
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 without any perturbations (reference scenario)  
 with measured fading   
 with measured fading scaled by a factor of 2 
 with measured fading scaled by a factor of  3 
The two-minute duration of perturbation is highlighted by two red dashed lines.  
This section first presents the results of scintillation effects during an aircraft turning 
scenario, and then during aircraft approach. In each scenario, the results from the Garmin 
receiver are presented first and then followed by the results from Septentrio receiver. The 
results presented here also compare between unclipped and clipped events for every 
scenario. 
7.3.1 Case Study 1: Scintillation Events during an Aircraft Turning Scenario  
Behaviour of a Garmin Receiver  
For both Events 1 and 2 given in Figures 7.9 and 7.10, respectively, measured fading applied 
to the three selected signals from the unobscured satellites during aircraft turning (PRNs 15, 
18 and 29) had no effect on the GDOP and HPL compared to the reference scenario when no 
perturbations were introduced. This indicates that the measured scintillation profiles are not 
strong enough to affect the aircraft navigation solution in both events. 
When the fading was scaled by a factor of 2 and 3, the GDOP and HPL increased at some 
instances. For Event 1 in Figure 7.9, the maximum value of the GDOP and HPL for both the 
scaled scenarios was 2.9 and 99, respectively. The scenario with the fading scaled by a factor 
of 3 showed more instances of higher GDOP and HPL values within the duration of 
perturbations compared to the other scenarios. Note that, as mentioned in Chapter 2 the 
lower the GDOP and HPL, the better precision and integrity of the navigation solutions.  
The same pattern of results were seen for Event 2 in Figure 7.10, except that the value of the 
GDOP and HPL rose higher for a longer time compared to results from Event 1. The fading 
scaled by a factor of 3 gave a GDOP value of 2.9 for 12 seconds, decreased back to 1.7, and 
then increased again to 2.9 for 19 seconds. Moreover, not only the fade scaled by 3, but also 
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the fade with scaled by 2 also gave higher GDOP and HPL during the duration of 
perturbations. 
The unclipped and clipped events were not shown any much different in both the GDOP and 
HPL. 
Behaviour of a Septentrio Receiver 
Figures 7.11 and 7.12 show the same results of the GDOP and HPL during the aircraft 
turning manoeuvre, but recorded and analysed using the Septentrio receiver. The fades 
seemed to not affect the GDOP and HPL in the geodetic receiver as much as in the aviation 
receiver during signal perturbations, except for a few instances when the values differ. 
Noteworthy is that, the HPL values observed with the Septentrio receiver for the scenarios 
with unclipped scintillation were lower than the values observed for the reference scenario 
with no scintillation (Figures 7.11 (c) and 7.12 (c)). The same was not observed for when the 
enhancements were clipped in the scintillating signal. This means that the Septentrio solution 
has better protection for scenarios with scintillation when there are signal enhancements as 
well as fading, where the enhancements contribute to a better (lower) HPL.  
This is in contrast to the Garmin receiver, where the presence of signal enhancements 
together with fading during scintillation had no (or worse) effects compared to the clipped 
profiles that only contained signal fading. 
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Figure 7.9 Garmin results of (a) GDOP for unclipped, (b)  GDOP for clipped, (c)  HPL  for unclipped, and (d)  HPL for clipped Event 1 during aircraft turning. 
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Figure 7.10 Garmin results of (a) GDOP for unclipped, (b)  GDOP for clipped, (c)  HPL  for unclipped, and (d)  HPL for clipped Event 2 during aircraft turning. 
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 Figure 7.11 Septentrio results of (a) GDOP for unclipped, (b)  GDOP for clipped, (c)  HPL  for unclipped, and (d)  HPL for clipped Event 1 during aircraft turning. 
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Figure 7.12 Septentrio results of (a) GDOP for unclipped, (b)  GDOP for clipped, (c)  HPL  for unclipped, and (d)  HPL for clipped Event 2 during aircraft turning. 
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7.3.2 Case Study 2: Scintillation Events during an Aircraft Approaching Scenario  
Behaviour of a Garmin Receiver 
In the approach scenario, the perturbations were introduced to all satellites in view. Since all 
satellites were perturbed simultaneously, the GDOP and HPL were observed to be high for 
the cases where the measured scintillation was scaled by factors 2 and 3. The GDOPs in the 
unclipped and clipped scenarios for Event 1, given in Figure 7.13 (a) and (b), show the 
maximum values for the scaled by 3 scenarios to be 5 and 29, respectively. The 
corresponding values of HPL are given in Figure 7.13 (c) and (d), where the values exceeded 
the HAL of 555.6 meters. This means that the horizontal radius of protection from the centre 
of the aircraft is too big, and exceeds the HAL of 555.6 meters; thus resulting in RAIM 
service not being available during these instances. 
In comparison, results for Event 2 (with deeper fades), given in Figure 7.14, indicate that the 
HPL exceeded the HAL for an extended time. This means that during this period the receiver 
would notify the pilot that RAIM operation required for horizontal protection in a non-
precision approach was no longer available to continue to operate. 
Behaviour of a Septentrio Receiver 
For Event 1 in Figure 7.15 (a) and (b), there is one instance when the x 3 scaled scintillation 
profile is applied (highlighted by a red circle) where GDOP went to 0. This is when signal 
fading was deep enough for the receiver to lose lock on the signals, resulting in the receiver 
being unable to calculate a PVT solution. During this instance, the maximum HPL in the 
unclipped scenario (Figure 7.15 (c)) increased to 947 meters while the HPL in the clipped 
scenario increased to 630 meters. As with the Garmin receiver, this means that the horizontal 
radius of protection from the centre of the aircraft is too big and exceeds the HAL. In other 
words, the precision has degraded so much that it is outside the receiver thresholds, and 
therefore the PVT solution is discarded by the receiver. Looking at the unclipped and clipped 
scintillation plots in Figure 7.16 (a) and (b), it can be noted that the GDOP for Event 2 has 
two instances where GDOP decreased to 0. During these instances, the HPL values for both 
results in Figure 7.16 (c) and (d) increased to 4071 meters and 1160 meters, respectively. 
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Figure 7.14 Garmin results of (a) GDOP for unclipped, (b)  GDOP for clipped, (c)  HPL  for unclipped, and (d)  HPL for clipped Event 2 during aircraft approach. 
104 
 








 (d)  
Figure 7.15 Septentrio results of (a) GDOP for unclipped, (b)  GDOP for clipped, (c)  HPL  for unclipped, and (d)  HPL for clipped Event 1 during aircraft approach. 
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This chapter aimed to investigate the effects of real scintillation events on turning and 
approach phases of an aircraft flightpath through Spirent simulations. The results can be 
summarised as follows:  
 From the two real scintillation events, Event 2 having longer and deeper fades than 
Event 1 had a stronger impact on both the aviation and the geodetic receivers during 
each of the flight phases of the aircraft.  
 
 The measured events gave similar results to the reference scenario where no 
scintillation was introduced for GDOP and HPL. This means that the measured 
events were not strong enough to affect the GDOP and HPL of either receiver. 
However, when these events were scaled by factors of 2 and 3 (to represent cases of 
severe scintillation), GDOP and HPL values were observed to increase in both 
Garmin and Septentrio receivers. This indicates that while the captured events may 
not have been severe enough, events stronger than the captured ones can impact GPS 
receivers. 
 
 The positive side (enhancement) of the scintillation profiles were clipped to 0 dB to 
remove the effects of signal enhancement during the simulation. Comparisons 
between unclipped and clipped (of enhancements) scintillation profiles showed that:  
o The Garmin receiver showed not much different on GDOP and HPL except 
that GDOP is much higher in some instances in clipped than in unclipped 
(seen in approach). 
o However, the Septentrio results gave an anomaly in the presence of signal 
enhancements together with fading during scintillation. The strong signal 
enhancement in the scaled profiles contributed to the better (lower) HPL, 
which was absent in the measured profiles. However, this could not be 
confirmed as it required looking in to internal processing by the receivers – 
which is beyond the scope of the study. 
 
 The investigation showed that, when signal perturbations induced by scintillation 
were introduced during aircraft turning (output from Garmin and Septentrio 
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receiver), RAIM services were still able to provide protection as the GDOP is 
always below 6 and the HPL did not exceed HAL. Even when five of the satellites 
were affected by aircraft turning and three heading unaffected satellites experienced 
scintillation, the remaining three good satellites maintained tracking consistently at 
good geometry; thus providing a navigation solution continuously. In contrast, 
during the approach phase, where all satellites in view were affected by 
perturbations, the Garmin aviation receiver gave GDOP values greater than 6 and the 
HPL exceeded HAL, indicating that RAIM protection was not available during these 
times for non-precision approach. In comparison, the Septentrio geodetic receiver 
lost lock on the affected signals at certain instances, resulting in no PVT solution 
being produced. The unavailability of a PVT solution was reflected in the GDOP, 
where the value decreased to 0. 
7.5 Summary 
This chapter discussed the implementation of real scintillation events during simulated 
scenarios of aircraft turning and approach (for landing). Applying scaled versions of the 
captured (measured) events to produce deeper fades representing severe amplitude 
scintillation events showed significant impact on the accuracy, availability and integrity of 
GPS PVT solutions. The results proved that deeper and longer fades affected the GDOP and 
HPL more than smaller fades. Investigation into signal enhancements occurring from direct 
scaling of events showed different results in the two receivers. The Garmin receiver showed 
not much different effects on GDOP and HPL for clipped and unclipped events. Unlike the 
Garmin aviation receiver, the Septentrio geodetic receiver responded better to scintillating 
signals with high signal enhancements (i.e unclipped events) than to a scenario with no 
scintillation. This was seen from the HPL values of the simulation with perturbations, which 
was smaller than the HPL values for the simulations without perturbations; which may have 
been due to receiver-specific processing effects of the Septentrio receiver. Simulating such 
scaled versions of real scintillation events for different phases of flight gave useful insight 
into how a GPS receiver used in aviation may respond under strong scintillation conditions, 
such as would be experienced during periods of high solar activity. 
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CHAPTER 8  
IMPACT OF MULTI-FREQUENCY SCINTILLATION ON AVIATION 
This chapter develops a technique to simulate L5 scintillation based on L1 data in order to 
understand the effect of scintillation on multiple GPS frequencies used in aviation. It is 
organised by first discussing the relationship between L1 signal intensity and its scintillation 
strengths through the use of scintillation strength (S4) equation (Equation 3.4 in Section 
3.5.1). This chapter then explains the generation of L5 data using L1 data and the 
scintillation strength scaling factor based on Equation 3.9 (Section 3.6.2). This is followed 
by discussing the validation of the derived L5 scintillation signatures. Finally, a scenario 
introducing L1 and L5 scintillation profiles on the respective simulated signals was 
implemented. The receiver response on both L1 and L5 scintillating signals were then 
analysed.  
8.1 Introduction  
As explained in Section 2.3, current aircraft systems use only a single civilian GPS 
frequency (L1) for its navigation. However, a modernised GPS frequency, known as GPS L5 
signal, has been recently allocated for aircraft navigation to provide better performance, and 
to enhance safety in civil aviation. The L5 signal, operated at 1176.45 MHz, is lower than 
the L1 carrier frequency (1575.42 MHz). Previous literature has shown that scintillation has 
an inverse dependency with frequency, where low frequencies experience stronger 
scintillation [Kaplan and Hegarty, 2006]. This means that the L5 signal can be more 
vulnerable to the scintillation compared to the L1 signal.  
The effects of scintillation on the lower L5 frequency have been studied by Delay et al., 
[2015], who reported a higher chance of receivers losing lock on L2C and L5 signals than on 
L1 when operating under equatorial scintillation conditions in Brazil; regardless of the 
current enhancement in their power levels and signal design. This is because L5 (and L2C) 
signals scintillation more relative to L1 and experience scintillation at longer Fresnel lengths 
(see Section 3.4). Moreover, for the same perturbations, the L5 signal can experience more 
phase shift compared to L1 [Kintner et al., 2007]. 
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As this study is to understand the effect of scintillation on the L5 signal, a technique to 
simulate the L5 scintillation was developed. This is because only GPS L1 data was available 
from data collected in Cape Verde. The L5 scintillation effects were thus derived from the 
L1 scintillation data based on Equation 3.9 (Section 3.6.2), which relates the strength of 
scintillation (S4) to the frequency band. The equation expressed that scintillation effects are 
stronger in the lower carrier frequencies than those of higher frequencies.  
8.2 Simulation Setup 
8.2.1 Introduction 
In order to create a scintillation signature for the L5 signal from L1 scintillation data, the 
relationship between the signal frequency (specifically for L1 and L5) and S4 index needs to 
be considered, as explained in Section 3.6.2. This is given in Equation (8.1), for clarity. 





= 1.55 𝑆4(𝐿1)                 (8.1) 
The equation states that the strength of the amplitude scintillation expressed in the S4 index 
is about 1.55 larger in L5 than in L1. This means that there are more effects of scintillation 
on the lower carrier frequency (L5: 1,176.45 MHz) than the higher carrier frequency (L1: 
1,575.42 MHz); if they are broadcast at the same received power level. It must be noted that, 
in this investigation, the differences in the signal power levels and signal design of L1 and 
L5 are not considered, and the S4 relationship between the two signals are applied directly to 
the nominal powers as transmitted by GPS. 
Since only the L1 signal power was available from the data collected in Cape Verde, the L1 
power was scaled based on the relationship in Equation (8.1) to represent the L5 signal 
power. However, the 1.55 scaling factor in the equation was the relation between the S4 
index of L1 and L5, and not the signal power of the two different frequencies. Therefore, 
verification was done to show that the scaling in the S4 index can be applied directly to scale 




Figure 8.1 presents the steps taken to verify that the use of the S4 scaling factor (1.55) to 
translate scintillation strength from L1 to L5 can be applied directly to scale the raw L1 






Figure 8.1 Steps to verify the relation between L1 and L5 intensities. 
The Septentrio PolaRxS receiver provides a command line tool called sfb2ismr that 
converts the 50 Hz raw data into Ionospheric Scintillation Monitoring Receiver (ISMR) data 
format. The ISMR file is an output file containing ionospheric scintillation (S4 index) indices 
and TEC information. In addition to the ISMR file, sbf2ismr is also able to produce an 
ASCII comma-delimited file comprising the raw I and Q, and phase data by using –r option 
[Septentrio, 2015]. The format of the command line is as follows: 
sbf2ismr -f InputFile [-o ISMRFile] [-r RawFile] 
As discussed in Section 3.5.1, the S4 index is calculated using the received signal intensity 
as given in Equation (8.2). 
          𝑆4 = √
〈𝐼2〉−〈𝐼〉2
⟨𝐼⟩2
                                                                                             (8.2) 
where I is the signal power and <> represent time-averaged measurements. In order to 
utilise this equation to calculate S4 from raw data output of the receiver, the signal intensity 
needs to be first calculated. This is achieved by using equation 𝐼2 + 𝑄2 (see Section 4.2.1), 

























8.2.2 Verification of the L1-L5 Scintillation Relationship 
A one-hour event with high S4 index from the Cape Verde data was selected to have at least 
60 separate values of the S4 index (i.e. a sampling rate of 1 minute). The event selected was 
for PRN 10 at 21:00:00 to 22:00:00 UT of 26
th
 September 2012. The signal power for the 
event selected is given in both linear and logarithmic (dB) scale in Figure 8.2. The fading in 
signal power in dB (Figure 8.2 (b)) represents the strong scintillation occurring within the 1-
hour duration. 
 
Figure 8.2 Received signal power in (a) linear power (arbitrary units) and (b) logarithmic power 
in dB for PRN 10 at 21:00:00 to 22:00:00 UT of 26th September 2012, containing all signal 
components including the scintillation signature. 
Since the verification process used the receiver-generated S4 for L1 from the ISMR file, it 
was important to ensure that no signal processing effects within the receiver would have 
impacted the S4 output for the signal. To confirm this, the S4 indices for the duration of the 
event retrieved directly from the ISMR file (using sfb2ismr command line tool), was 
compared against the S4 calculated from the raw data (using Equation 8.2). The results are 




Figure 8.3 S4 index of the one-hour L1 scintillation event retrieved from the ISMR file and 
through calculation. 
The green line in Figure 8.3 indicates the S4 index from the receiver’s ISMR file, while the 
blue line indicates the calculated S4 index. The graphs show that the receiver-produced S4 is 
the same as that calculated from the raw data. This confirmed that no additional receiver-
specific processing contributes to the receiver-produced S4 (i.e. ISMR data), and that the S4 
index for L1 in the two red boxes in Figure 8.1 gave the same results. This was important, as 
the scaling and comparison of S4 and raw data require the calculated and receiver-generated 
scintillation indices to be consistent. 
The next step in the verification process was to confirm that the scaling of S4 has a linear 
relationship with the scaling of raw power, such that the scaled raw power gives an S4 scaled 
by the same factor. To show this, the raw power of L1 was multiplied by the scaling factor 
1.55, and the calculated S4 of the scaled power is compared against the direct scaling of the 
S4 index (Equation (8.3)). Figure 8.4 shows this comparison together with the original S4 of 
L1. The blue plot shows the original S4 (L1), the red plot shows the direct scaling of S4 (right 
hand side of Equation (8.3)), and the green plot shows the calculated S4 after scaling of the 
raw power (middle part of Equation (8.3)).         
𝑆4(𝐿5) = √
〈(1.55 × 𝐼𝐿1)2〉−〈1.55 × 𝐼𝐿1〉2
⟨1.55 × 𝐼𝐿1⟩




Figure 8.4 S4 index of L1 signal and scaled L1 signals to represent the S4 index of the L5 signal. 
As can be seen from Figure 8.4, both the scaled datasets now represent the S4 index for the 
L5 signal. There are some small differences when scaling the S4 index of the L1 signal 
directly compared to scaling the raw power of the L1 signal using the Equation (8.3). 
However, these were due to internal receiver processing effects and the differences did not 
exceed 5% from each other.  Figure 8.4 thus confirmed that the S4 index (L5) in the two 
purple boxes in Figure 8.1 gave the same results; verifying that the L1 raw signal power can 
be directly scaled by the S4 scaling factor to produce the raw scintillating profile for the L5 
signal. 
8.2.3 Creating Scintillation Profiles for L5 using L1 Signal Power  
This section discusses the process of producing a scintillation signature for the L5 signal 
from the L1 raw signal power, to be simulated in the Spirent simulator. Since the aim of the 
study is to understand the effect of scintillation on multiple GPS frequencies used in 
aviation, the L1 scintillation profile is also introduced onto the simulated L1 signal. Figure 










Figure 8.5 Steps to create scintillation profiles for L5 Signal using L1 signal power. 
The first step of the process was to extract a scintillation profile for L1 from the live-sky data 
captured from Cape Verde. This was done using the method explained in Section 4.2.1, 
where the raw data from Cape Verde for the selected one-hour event was detrended to isolate 
the scintillation profile. The profile for L5 was derived by taking the same one-hour raw data 
for L1 and scaling the linear signal power by a factor 1.55, after which it was detrended as 
with the L1 scintillation profile. Figure 8.6 shows the selected one-hour L1 signal power 
before the detrending process in both the linear and logarithmic (dB) scales. The blue signal 





Figure 8.6 The measured and scaled L1 signal power plotted in (a) linear (arbitrary units) and (b) 
logarithmic (dB) power for PRN 10 at 21:00:00 to 22:00:00 UT of 26th September 2012, 

























It must be noted that, one change was made to the detrending process described in Section 
4.2.1 (Equation (4.1)), when adopting it for this investigation. Here, the power data was 
normalised using a moving mean method instead of a LPF, as described in Section 4.2.1. 
This is because, it was observed that normalising the power with the moving mean method 
gave a smoother output compared to LPF. The mean power for the one hour duration event 
derived from LPF is noisier than using the moving mean method resulting in a detrended 
signal that has artefacts. While this was not a significant issue for the previous investigations 
due to that the earlier chapters, the signals used were very short duration (2 minutes) and the 
events were carefully selected to ensure that the derived mean was not so noisy, therefore the 
derived power did not have the artefacts. Following the detrending process, any signal power 
values derived as infinite are set to -49 dB, the minimum power value allowed by the 
simulator, to synthesise a loss of the signal. This is because the infinite values are a 
mathematical value obtained due to the normalising instantaneous power being zero – which 





Figure 8.7 The scintillation profiles for the L1 and scaled L1 (L5 signal) plotted in (a) linear 





Figure 8.7 presents the scintillation profiles extracted from the process raw signal power (i.e. 
post-detrend) for the measured and scaled L1 signals; effectively representing a scintillation 
profile for the L1 and L5 signal, respectively. Figure 8.7 (a) is the scintillation profiles 
plotted in linear form, while Figure 8.7 (b) shows the same signals in logarithmic scales 
(dB). These unscaled and scaled scintillation profiles were then introduced into the simulator 
via UCD files as perturbation on the L1 and L5 signals, respectively. The details on UCD 
file preparation was explained in Section 4.3. 
8.2.4 Simulation 
Once the scintillation profiles were generated, the next step was to set up a scenario in the 
Spirent SimGEN software as explained in Section 4.4. In this experiment, the scenario was 
set up such that the scintillation would affect a single satellite through the event duration of 
one hour. The GPS L1 and L5 signals were enabled and the induced signal perturbations 
were introduced to both signals simultaneously. The output from the Septentrio geodetic 
receiver was recorded and analysed. The Septentrio receiver is used as the tools were 
available to analyse the raw data output which is not available with the aviation receiver. 
8.3 Observation and Analysis 
Figure 8.8 shows the output C/N0 received when the perturbations were introduced on L1 
and L5 signals of the same PRN during the one-hour simulation. The blue line graph is the 
C/N0 for the simulated L1 signal while the red line graph is the C/N0 for the simulated L5 
signal. As seen in the figure, the mean L5 C/N0 measured by the receiver is higher than for 
L1. This is because the L5 signal is designed to broadcast at a higher power compared to the 
L1 signal. 
It can be seen from Figure 8.8 that L5 experiences deeper fades than L1 as the L5 has deeper 
drops compared to the L1 signal. This is expected due to the x1.55 scaling of scintillation 





Figure 8.8 Simulated received signal power of L1 and L5 signals with scintillation recorded using 
Septentrio receiver. 
As mentioned before, the aim of this study is to understand the impact on the receiver when 
perturbations were introduced to both L1 and L5 signals simultaneously; in particular, the 
loss-of-lock behaviour of the signals at the receiver. A detailed inspection of Figure 8.8 
showed that the Septentrio receiver did lose lock on the L5 signal multiple times during the 
one-hour simulation. Figure 8.9 shows the zoomed in plot of the C/N0 with selected losses of 
lock highlighted on the L5 signal. 
 


































In addition to the C/N0, the S4 index was also observed for the simulated event. Figure 8.10 
compares the total S4 index between the L1 and L5 signals, as measured by the receiver. It 
can be seen that the S4 index for the L5 signal is higher compared to the L1 signal, although 
the maximum peaks between the two does not show much difference. This because, very 
high S4 values generally leads to a loss of lock on the signal, resulting in a loss of 
information that effectively limit the maximum S4 that can be calculated.  
 
Figure 8.10 S4 index of the simulated L1 and L5 signals. 
8.4 Discussion 
This chapter has shown that the relationship between L1 and L5 signal intensities can be 
derived from the scintillation strength equation. This was done by first verifying that the S4 
index retrieved from raw data was the same as the S4 index produced directly using the 
receiver software tool. Figure 8.3 showed that the S4 indices retrieved from the calculated 
and from the ISMR file correlate well with each other. Once this was confirmed, the direct 
applicability of the S4 scaling to the linear signal power to generate scaled scintillation was 
tested. This was done by scaling the raw L1 (linear) signal power in Equation 8.2 by the 
same scaling factor as in the S4 index equation (Equation 8.1), and then re-calculating S4 
from the scaled signal intensity. The result was then compared with the scaled S4 index of 
the L1 signal (by the same scaling factor). The plots in Figure 8.4 demonstrated that the S4 
values for both cases are almost the same except for some negligible differences due to 
receiver processing effects. Once the applicability of S4 scaling on linear signal power was 
demonstrated, the offstage of the chapter attempted to create a scintillation signature for the 
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L5 signal by employing the L1 scintillation data collected from Cape Verde. The L1 raw 
(linear) signal intensity was scaled by a factor of 1.55 to represent the L5 raw signal power. 
Then, the detrending process was applied to produce a scintillation event for the L5 signal. 
After both L1 and L5 scintillation events were simulated using the Spirent simulator, the 
Septentrio receiver responses to the two different frequencies used in aviation were recorded 
and analysed. The received C/N0 showed that the receiver received the L5 signal power a bit 
higher than L1 signal. This is due to the L5 signal which was designed to be transmitted at a 
higher power compared to the L1 signal. The L5 C/N0, expressed in dB-Hz, dropped more 
compared to the L1 signal. Consequently, the receiver lost lock on the L5 signal multiple 
times during the one-hour simulation. The receiver maintained lock on the L1 signal 
throughout the simulation. The reason for this was the scaling of scintillation by a factor of 
1.55 that was applied to the L5 signal, leading to deep fades that resulted in the loss of signal 
power produced by the simulator. In comparison, while there were signal fades 
corresponding scintillation in the L1 signal, the fades were not deep enough for the simulator 
synthesise a loss of signal.   
Observation of the receiver-generated S4 index for the simulated L1 and L5 signals showed 
a higher S4 for L5 than L1. The difference was however minimised at high S4 values as more 
losses of lock occurred with increasing scintillation strength. This lead to a loss of 
information to calculate the S4 index, thus resulting in the S4 values reaching a maximum of 
~1.2, regardless of actual scintillation being higher. This result indicates that L5 signal was 
successfully simulated based on L1 data and the L5 signal which is located below the L1 
frequency band can be more vulnerable to scintillation.  
8.5 Summary 
In the absence of real observations of scintillation data for the L5 signal, the scintillation 
effects on the L1 and L5 signals can still be investigated by utilising the relationship between 
the scintillation index, S4, and signal frequency. Scintillation in L5 can be estimated by 
multiplying the L1 signal power by the scaling factor 1.55 as given in the S4-frequency 
equation, and detrending this scaled signal power to extract the scintillation profile. This, 
together with the original scintillation profile of L1 can be implemented within a Spirent 
simulator to successfully synthesise ionospheric scintillation on these two frequencies. In the 
future, more simulations can be done to investigate the performance of aviation receivers 
when scintillation is introduced on these two frequencies. 
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CHAPTER 9  
CONCLUSIONS & FUTURE WORK 
An investigation into ionospheric scintillation effects on GPS in aviation at low latitudes was 
the main goal of this PhD.  At the start of the research there was a lack of literature and 
information in this area and it was important to understand the implications of the latest 
scientific research in scintillation for the use of GPS in the aviation industry. The effects of 
amplitude scintillation were the main concern in this study as at low latitudes, where 
amplitude scintillation is dominant compared to phase scintillation. In addition, aviation 
receivers are typically navigating using the code (delay) part of the GNSS signal and are less 
concerned with the phase observation.   
A method of GNSS signal simulation in hardware, developed by Spirent Communications, 
was adapted to investigate the receiver performance under ionospheric scintillation 
conditions. The study has used some ionospheric scintillation data collected over the past 
few years in Cape Verde as the basis of the simulation.  
Chapter 4 described the method for simulating ionospheric scintillation by means of the 
Spirent simulator. The first step was by synthesising the effects of amplitude scintillation 
either from real scintillation events or from a simple mathematical model. The capability of 
creating changing effects on the signal in Spirent’s SimGEN software depending on the 
scenarios, allowed receiver performance to be analysed in a repeatable controlled 
environment. The performances of a geodetic receiver (Septentrio PolaRxS) and an aviation 
receiver (Garmin 480) when experiencing amplitude scintillation were investigated through 
scenarios generated by the simulator. This showed that investigating ionospheric scintillation 
effects on receivers through simulation in hardware was a practical and an efficient 
technique. 
Chapter 5 revealed the capabilities of the Septentrio and Garmin receivers to cope with 
scintillation induced signal. The results of loss of lock probability graphs clearly highlighted 
the depths and durations of fades which may probably cause a loss of lock on those 
receivers. It was shown that the Septentrio receiver has no problem with scintillation events 
with a fade depth of up to 19 dB over all durations of fading. It was also shown that for 
deeper fades with short durations, the receiver is more vulnerable to lose lock with a 
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complete signal drop than the gradually signal drop. The Septentrio receiver had more 
vulnerability to lose lock onto the signals with the square fade profile compared to the cosine 
profile. When the systematic analysis of the square fade profile was repeated using the 
Garmin receiver, the research found that the aviation receiver is more sensitive than the 
geodetic receiver as the Garmin started to have a problem to lock with a fade at 17 dB and 
also completely lost lock at fades of 25 dB even for very small durations. One of the more 
significant findings to emerge from this study is that there was a surprising loss of lock 
probability graph at the fade duration of 55 seconds retrieved from Garmin receiver. At this 
specific duration, the signal tracking can be affected by the fade depth of 18 dB. Further 
detailed analysis is required to understand the reasons for the anomaly, as some effects may 
be receiver-specific and affected by the type of PLL used for signal acquisition and tracking. 
The importance of satellite geometry and how fading and real scintillation events can 
threaten the GPS aviation receiver during simulated aircraft scenarios were investigated in 
the case studies presented in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7.   
Chapter 6 revealed the effects of single and rapid multiple amplitude fades which were 
introduced to the nominal signals for different satellite geometry during an aircraft non-
precision approach scenario. The satellites at a low elevation which have already lower 
signal strength were found to be essential in providing good navigation solutions especially 
when there are within the satellite best-set. This is evidenced by the observed degradation in 
precision and integrity of the navigation solution compared to when perturbing the satellites 
at high elevation.   
The study has also shown that at a given fade depth, longer fade durations were observed to 
cause a receiver to lose lock on the signals compared to short rapid multiple fades. This is 
especially the case when the affected satellite is already at low elevation and thus has a lower 
initial signal strength. Failure of RAIM services has occurred when there was an 
unacceptable strong fade as found in this study. 
Chapter 7 revealed the receiver performance when real amplitude scintillation events were 
introduced during an aircraft simulation of turning and approaching a landing. When two 
different scales of scintillation events were simulated, the results demonstrated, as expected, 
that larger and longer fades gave more effects on GDOP and HPL compared to smaller 
fades.  While this was expected it is important to know that the GDOP and HPL parameters 
are responding to scintillation-induced signal degradation events.   
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The study revealed an unexpected result with the Septentrio receiver.  When the Septentrio 
receiver experienced high signal enhancements (unclipped events), as would be the case in a 
truly diffracting medium, it performed better than the non-scintillating signal. The reason for 
this could be due to the Septentrio receiver-specific effects on the signal fade characteristics, 
where is may be integrating through fades and benefitting from the short-term enhanced 
signal level.  
When there were only three clear satellites out of all eleven satellites (the rest of the satellite 
signals were dropped due to the aircraft turning and perturbations) during the aircraft 
turning, RAIM services were still able to provide a solution and suitable warning 
information. However, during the extreme scenario of approaching, where all satellites in 
view were affected by the perturbations, the receiver would notify that RAIM operation 
required for horizontal protection in a non-precision approach was no longer available to 
continue to operate. 
A simulation introducing different scales of real scintillation events during a different phase 
of flight is very important to predict what can happen especially during the periods of high 
solar cycle activity.  
The evidence from this study suggests that RAIM or the development of RAIM could be 
enhanced to alarm (warn) users when ionospheric scintillation happens to be affecting 
satellites before the effect is so severe to lose the satellite signal.   
Chapter 8 aimed to investigate the effects of scintillation on multiple GPS frequencies used 
in aviation. As there was lack of real observations of scintillation data from the L5 signal, the 
scintillation effect on the L5 signals was investigated through the assumption given in the 
well-known equation relating the scintillation effects on the different frequency bands. The 
L5 signal power was estimated by multiplying the L1 signal power by 1.55 scaling factor as 
in the intensity of scintillation equation. The simulation result has demonstrated that in 
contrary to the higher transmitted signal power of L5, the L5 signal can be more vulnerable 
to the scintillation compared to the L1 signal. This is an important result that should be 
verified by experimental observations in the field, because it has important implications for 
aviation safety.  
123 
 
Further research should explore the effects of ionospheric scintillation on the Vertical 
Protection Level (VPL) during aircraft approach which is more crucial for the aircraft 
navigation and guidance. 
The findings of this research lay down a foundation for application specific studies of the 
effects on ionospheric scintillation on various systems such as autonomous vehicles (self-
drive cars), unmanned aerial vehicles and the use of GNSS for the rail system.  The recent 
development of new GNSS constellations and the use of multi-constellation, multi-frequency 
receivers will open up the possibility for an enhanced service.  Nevertheless the implications 
of ionospheric threats to any possible scenario of safety or mission critical GNSS usage 
should always be considered and systematically tested before confidence can be placed into 
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d : 0-23 (defaults to 0 if not used) 
hh : 0-23 
mm : 0-59 
ss : 0-59 





vehicle_id:  “v”<v_number> 
v_number: vehicle number starting from 1 
antenna_id: “a”<a_number> 
a_number: antenna number starting from 1 
v1_a1 
signal_type “EGNOS” or "GALILEO" or “GLONASS”or “GPS” or “GROUND TX” or “IRNSS”or “MSAS” or “WAAS” gps 
id 0-n (Channel number) or 1-n (Satellite SVID) 14 
multi_index “0” (incident signal) or (number of the multipath starting at 1 - this only applies in SVID mode) 0 
mode ”0” (svid mode, use id = 1-n) or “1” (channel mode, use id = 0-n) 0 
all_flag “0” (apply to specified channel / SVID) or “1” (apply to all channels / SVIDs) 0 
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Parameter  Format Example 
freq 
EGNOS: “0” (L1) | “2” (L5) 
GALILEO: “0” (E1) | “1” (E6) | “2” (E5) 
GLONASS: “0” (L1) | “1” (L2) 
GPS: “0” (L1) | “1” (L2) | “2” (L5) 
IRNSS: “0” (S-band) | “2” (L5) 
MSAS: “0” (L1) | “2” (L5) 
0 
all_freq ”0” (single frequency) or “1” (all frequencies) 0 
sig_level signal level, dB, decimal value positive. Value gives increase in level 3.2 
carr_offset carrier offset, m, (decimal number) 10.7 
code_offset code offset, m, (decimal number) 10.65 
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Appendix B: Antenna pattern: ANTCOM Corporation 
 
 
